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ABSTRACT
This research investigates the use of data mining methods for malware (malicious programs) de-
tection and proposed a framework as an alternative to the traditional signature detection methods.
The traditional approaches using signatures to detect malicious programs fails for the new and un-
known malwares case, where signatures are not available. We present a data mining framework to
detect malicious programs. We collected, analyzed and processed several thousand malicious and
clean programs to find out the best features and build models that can classify a given program
into a malware or a clean class. Our research is closely related to information retrieval and classi-
fication techniques and borrows a number of ideas from the field. We used a vector space model
to represent the programs in our collection. Our data mining framework includes two separate
and distinct classes of experiments. The first are the supervised learning experiments that used a
dataset, consisting of several thousand malicious and clean program samples to train, validate and
test, an array of classifiers. In the second class of experiments, we proposed using sequential as-
sociation analysis for feature selection and automatic signature extraction. With our experiments,
we were able to achieve as high as 98.4% detection rate and as low as 1.9% false positive rate on
novel malwares.
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Computer virus detection has evolved into malicious program detection since Cohen first formal-
ized the term computer virus in 1983 [Coh85]. Malicious programs can be classified into viruses,
worms, trojans, spywares, adwares and a variety of other classes and subclasses that sometimes
overlap and blur the boundaries among these classes [Szo05]. Both traditional signature based
detection and generalized approaches can be used to identify these malicious programs. To avoid
detection by the traditional signature-based algorithms, a number of stealth techniques have been
developed by the malicious code writers. The inability of traditional signature based detection
approaches to catch these new breed of malicious programs has shifted the focus of virus research
to find more generalized and scalable features that can identify malicious behavior as a process
instead of a single signature action.
We present a data mining approach to the problem of malware detection. Data mining has
been a recent focus of malware detection research. Section 2.5 presents a literature review of the
data mining techniques used for virus and worm detection. Our approach combines the ease of an
automated syntactic analysis with the power of semantic level analysis requiring human expertise
to reflect critical program behavior that can classify between malicious and benign programs. We




This section introduces various computer security terms to the reader. Since our work deals with
computer virus and worms, a more detailed account of these categories is presented than any other
area in security.
1.1.1 Computer Security
Computer security is the effort to create a secure computing platform, designed so that agents
(users or programs) can only perform actions that have been allowed.
1.1.2 Malware
Any program that is purposefully created to harm the computer system operations or data is termed
as malicious programs. Malicious programs include viruses, worms, trojans, backdoors, adwares,
spywares, bots, rootkits etc. All malwares are sometimes loosely termed as virus (viruses, worms,
trojans specifically) Commercial anti-malware products are still called antivirus.
1.1.3 Spam
Spam is abuse of electronic messaging systems to send unsolicited bulk messages Most widely
recognized form is email spam. Also includes IM spam, blog spam, discussion forum spam, cell
phone messaging spam etc.
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1.1.4 Phishing
Phishing can be defined as a criminal activity using social engineering techniques. The most
common example of phishing is an email asking to enter account/credit card information for e-
commerce websites (ebay, amazon etc) and online banking.
1.1.5 Exploits
An exploit is a piece of software, a chunk of data, or sequence of commands that take advantage
of a bug, glitch or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur
on computer software, hardware, or something electronic (usually computerized). This frequently
includes such things as gaining control of a computer system or allowing privilege escalation or a
denial of service attack.
1.2 Malware
Malware is a relatively new term that gets its name from malicious software. Many users are still
unfamiliar with the term. Most of the time all malware are grouped under the umbrella term virus.
For the detection of malware, the industry still use the term antivirus not antimalware, though the
product caters all malware.
1.2.1 Virus
Computer virus is a self replicating code (including possibly evolved copies of itself) that infects
other executable programs. Viruses usually need human intervention for replication and execution.
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1.2.2 Worm
Computer worm is a self replicating stand alone program that spreads on computer networks.
Worms usually do not need any extra help from a user to replicate and execute.
1.2.3 Trojan
Trojan horses or simply trojans are programs that perform some malicious activity under the guise
of some normal program. The term is derived from the classical myth of the Trojan Horse.
1.2.4 Spyware
Spyware is computer software that is installed surreptitiously on a personal computer to intercept
or take partial control over the user’s interaction with the computer, without the user’s informed
consent.
1.2.5 Others
Other malware programs include logic bombs, that are an intended malfunction of a legitimate
program, rootkits, that are a set of hacker tools intended to conceal running process from operating
system, backdoor, that is a method to bypass normal computer authentication.
1.3 Virus
Computer virus is a self replicating code (including possibly evolved copies of itself) that infects
other executable programs. Viruses usually need human intervention for replication and execution.
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1.3.1 Classification by Target
This section define target as the means exploited by the virus for execution. Based upon the target
viruses can be classified into three major classes.
1.3.1.1 Boot Sector Virus
Master Boot Record (Boot sector in DOS) is a piece of code that runs every time a computer
system is booted. Boot sector virus infect the MBR on the disk, hence getting the privilege of
getting executed every time the computer system starts up.
1.3.1.2 File Virus
File virus is the most common form of viruses. They infect the file system on a computer. File
virus infect executable programs and are executed every time the infected program is run.
1.3.1.3 Macro Virus
Macro virus infect documents and templates instead of executable programs. It is written in a
macro programming language that is built into applications like Microsoft Word or Excel. Macro
virus can be automatically executed every time the document is opened with the application.
1.3.2 Classification by Self-Protection Strategy
Self-protection strategy can be defined as the technique used by a virus to avoid detection. In
other words, the anti-antivirus techniques. Based upon self-protection strategies, viruses can be
classified into the following categories.
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1.3.2.1 No Concealment
Based upon the self-protection strategy the first category can be defined as the one without any
concealment. The virus code is clean without any garbage instructions or encryption.
1.3.2.2 Code Obfuscation
Code obfuscation is a technique developed to avoid specific-signature detection. These include
adding no-op instructions, unnecessary jumps etc, so the virus code look muddled and the signature
fails.
1.3.2.3 Encryption
The next line of defense by the virus writers to defeat signature detection was code encryption.
Encrypted viruses use an encrypted virus body and an unencrypted decryption engine. For each
infection, the virus is encrypted with a different key to avoid giving a constant signature.
1.3.2.4 Polymorphism
Encrypted virus were caught by the presence of the unencrypted decryption engine that remain
constant for every infection. This was cured by the mutating techniques. Polymorphic virus feature
a mutation engine that generates the decryption engine on the fly. It consists of a decryption engine,
a mutation engine and payload. The encrypted virus body and the mutating decryption engine
refused to provide a constant signature.
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1.3.2.5 Metamorphism
Metamorphic virus is a self mutating virus in its truest form of the word at it has no constant parts.
The virus body itself changes during the infection process and hence the infected file represents a
new generation that does not resemble the parent.
1.3.2.6 Stealth
Stealth techniques, also called code armoring, refers to the set of techniques developed by the
virus writers to avoid the recent detection methods of activity monitoring, code emulation etc. The
techniques include anti-disassembly, anti-debugging, anti-emulation, anti-heuristics etc.
1.4 Worm
A computer worm is a program that self-propagates across a network exploiting security or policy
flaws in widely-used services.
Dan Ellis [Ell03], defined the life cycle of worms. Based upon the operations involved in each
phase in the life cycle, worms can be classified into different categories. The following taxonomy
was used by [WPS03] using similar factors.
1.4.1 Activation
Activation defines the means by which a worm is activated onto the target system. This is the first




This is the slowest form of activation that requires a human to execute the worm.
1.4.1.2 Human Activity-Based Activation
In this form of activation, the worm execution is based upon some action that the user perform not
directly related to the worm such as launching an application program etc.
1.4.1.3 Scheduled Process Activation
This type of activation depends upon scheduled system processes such as automatic download of
software updates etc.
1.4.1.4 Self Activation
This is the fastest form of activation where a worm initialize its execution by exploiting the vul-
nerabilities in the programs that are always running such as database or web servers.
1.4.2 Payload
The next phase in the worm’s life cycle is payload delivery. Payload describes what a worm does
after the infection.
1.4.2.1 None
Majority of worms do not carry any payload. The still cause havoc by increasing machine and
network traffic load.
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1.4.2.2 Internet Remote Control
Some worms open a backdoor on the victims machine thus allowing others to connect to that
machine via internet.
1.4.2.3 Spam-Relays
Some worms convert the victim machine into a spam relay, thus allowing spammers to use it as a
server.
1.4.3 Target Discovery
Once the payload is delivered, the worm start looking for new targets to attack.
1.4.3.1 Scanning Worms
Scanning worms scan for targets by scanning sequentially through a block of addresses or by
scanning randomly.
1.4.3.2 Flash Worms
Flash worms use a pre-generated target list or a hit list to accelerate the target discovery process.
1.4.3.3 Metaserver Worms
This type of worms use a list of addresses to infect maintained by an external metaserver.
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1.4.3.4 Topological Worms
Topological worms try to find the local communication topology by searching through a list of
hosts maintained by application programs.
1.4.3.5 Passive Worms
Passive worms rely on user intervention or targets to contact worm for their execution.
1.4.4 Propagation
Propagation defines the means by which a worm spreads on a network. Based upon the propagation
mechanism worms can be divided into the following categories.
1.4.4.1 Self-Carried
Self carried worms are usually self activated. They copy themselves to the target as part of the
infection process.
1.4.4.2 Second Channel
Second channel worm copy their body after the infection by creating a connection from target to
host to download the body.
1.4.4.3 Embedded
Embedded worms, embed themselves in the normal communication process as a stealth technique.
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1.5 Trojans
While the words Trojan, worm and virus are often used interchangeably, they are not the same.
Viruses, worms and Trojan Horses are all malicious programs that can cause damage to your
computer, but there are differences among the three. A Trojan horse, also known as a Trojan, is a
piece of malware, which appears to perform a certain action but in fact performs another such as
transmitting a computer virus. At first glance it will appear to be useful software but will actually
do damage once installed or run on your computer. Those on the receiving end of a Trojan horse
are usually tricked into opening them because they appear to be receiving legitimate software
or files from a legitimate source. When a Trojan is activated on your computer, the results can
vary. Some Trojans are designed to be more annoying than malicious (like changing your desktop,
adding silly active desktop icons) or they can cause serious damage by deleting files and destroying
information on your system. Trojans are also known to create a backdoor on your computer that
gives malicious users access to your system, possibly allowing confidential or personal information
to be compromised. Unlike viruses and worms, Trojans do not reproduce by infecting other files
nor do they self-replicate. Simply put, a Trojan horse is not a computer virus. Unlike such malware,
it does not propagate by self-replication but relies heavily on the exploitation of an end-user. It is
instead a categorical attribute, which can encompass many different forms of codes. Therefore, a
computer worm or virus may be a Trojan horse. The term is derived from the classical story of the
Trojan horse.
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1.5.1 How Trojans Work
Trojans usually consist of two parts, a Client and a Server. The server is run on the victim’s
machine and listens for connections from a Client, which is used by the attacker. When the server
is run on a machine it will listen on a specific port or multiple ports for connections from a Client.
In order for an attacker to connect to the server they must have the IP Address of the computer
where the server is being run. Some Trojans have the IP Address of the computer they are running
on sent to the attacker via email or another form or communication. Once a connection is made
to the server, the client can then send commands to the server; the server will then execute these
commands on the victim’s machine.
Today, with NAT infrastructure being very common, most computers cannot be reached by their
external IP address. Therefore many Trojans now connect to the computer of the attacker, which
has been set up to take the connections, instead of the attacker connecting to his or her victim. This
is called a ’reverse-connect’ Trojan. Many Trojans nowadays also bypass many personal firewall
installed on the victims computer. (E.g. Poison Ivy)
Trojans are extremely simple to create in many programming languages. A simple Trojan in
Visual Basic or C# using Visual Studio can be achieved in 10 lines of code or under. Probably
the most famous Trojan horse is the AIDS TROJAN DISK that was sent to about 7000 research
organizations on a diskette. When the Trojan was introduced on the system, it scrambled the name
of all files (except a few) and filled the empty areas of the disk completely. The program offered a
recovery solution in exchange of a bounty. Thus, malicious cryptography was born.
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1.5.2 Trojan Types
Trojans are generally the programs that pose as legitimate programs on your computer and add a
subversive functionality to it. That’s when it’s said a program is Trojaned. Common functions of
Trojans include, but are not limited to, the following:
1.5.2.1 Remote Access Trojans
These are probably the most widely used trojans, just because they give the attackers the power to
do more things on the victim’s machine than the victim itself while being in front of the machine.
Most of these trojans are often a combination of the other variations described below. The idea
of these trojans is to give the attacker a total access to someone’s machine and therefore access to
files, private conversations, accounting data, etc.
1.5.2.2 Password Sending Trojans
The purpose of these trojans is to rip all the cached passwords and also look for other passwords
you’re entering and then send them to a specific mail address without the user noticing anything.
Passwords for ICQ, IRC, FTP, HTTP or any other application that require a user to enter a lo-
gin+password are being sent back to the attacker’s email address, which in most cases is located
at some free web based email provider.
1.5.2.3 Keyloggers
These trojans are very simple. The only thing they do is logging the keystrokes of the victim and
then letting the attacker search for passwords or other sensitive data in the log file. Most of them
13
come with two functions like online and offline recording. Of course, they could be configured to
send the log file to a specific email address on a schedule basis.
1.5.2.4 Destructive
The only function of these trojans is to destroy and delete files. This makes them very simple
and easy to use. They can automatically delete all the system files on your machine. The trojan
is being activated by the attacker or sometimes works like a logic bomb and starts on a specific
day and at specific hour. Denial Of Service (DoS) Attack Trojans These trojans are getting very
popular these days, giving the attacker the power to start DDoS when having enough victims, of
course. The main idea is that if you have 200 ADSL users infected and start attacking the victim
simultaneously, this will generate a lot of traffic (more then the victim’s bandwidth, in most cases)
and its the access to the Internet will be shut down.
1.5.2.5 Mail-Bomb Trojan
This is another variation of a DoS trojan whose main aim is to infect as many machines as possi-
ble and simultaneously attack specific email address/addresses with random subjects and contents
which cannot be filtered.
1.5.2.6 Proxy/Wingate Trojans
The interesting feature implemented in many trojans is turning the victim’s computer into a proxy/wingate
server available to the whole world or to the attacker only. It’s used for anonymous Telnet, ICQ,
IRC, etc., and also for registering domains with stolen credit cards and for many other illegal ac-
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tivities. This gives the attacker complete anonymity and the chance to do everything from your
computer, and if he/she gets caught, the trace leads back to you.
1.5.2.7 FTP Trojans
These trojans are probably the most simple ones and are kind of outdated as the only thing they do
is to open port 21 (the port for FTP transfers) and let everyone or just the attacker connect to your
machine. Newer versions are password protected, so only the one who infected you may connect
to your computer.
1.5.2.8 Software Detection Killers
There are such functionalities built into some trojans, but there are also separate programs that
will kill ZoneAlarm, Norton Anti-Virus and many other (popular anti-virus/firewall) programs that
protect your machine. When they are disabled, the attacker will have full access to your machine
to perform some illegal activity, use your computer to attack others and often disappear. Even
though you may notice that these programs are not working or functioning properly, it will take
you some time to remove the trojan, install the new software, configure it and get back online with
some sense of security.
1.6 Data Mining
Data mining has been defined as ”the nontrivial extraction of implicit, previously unknown, and
potentially useful information from data” [FPM92] and ”the science of extracting useful informa-
tion from large data sets or databases” [HH01].
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Data mining can be divided into two broad categories.
• Predictive data mining, involves predicting unknown values based upon given data items.
• Descriptive data mining, involves finding patterns describing the data.
[Kan02] described the following tasks associated with data mining.
• Classification: the process of classifying data items into two or more pre defined classes.
• Regression: predicting the average value of one item on the basis of known value(s) of other
item(s).
• Clustering: identifying a finite set of categories for the data.
• Summarization: finding a compact description of the data.
• Dependency Modeling: finding a local model that describes significant dependencies be-
tween variables.
• Change and Deviation Detection: discovering the most significant changes in the data set.
The final outcome of a data mining process is a model or a collection of models. A number
of data mining techniques are available for the model building process. These techniques are not





Chapter 1 provided a brief overview of the areas in computer security with special emphasis on
viruses and worms. In this chapter, a literature survey is provided that structures the theoretical
foundation for this research.
The term computer virus was first used in a science fiction novel by David Gerrold in 1972,
When HARLIE Was One [Ger72], which includes a description of a fictional computer program
called virus and was able to self-replicate. The first academic use of the term was claimed by
Fred Cohen in 1983. The first published account of the term can be found a year later by Cohen
in his paper Experiments with Computer Viruses [Coh84]. In his paper Cohen credits his advisor
Professor Len Adleman for coining the term.
Though Cohen first used the term, some early accounts of viruses can be found. According to
[Fer92], the first reported incidents of true viruses were in 1981 and 1982 on the Apple II computer.
Elk Cloner is considered to be the first documented example of a virus in mid-1981. The first PC
virus was a boot sector virus called Brain in 1986 [JH90].
Worm also owe their existence to science fiction literature. John Brunner’s Shockwave Rider
[Bru75] introduced us to worm, a program that propagates itself on a computer network. [SH82]
claim the first use of the term in academic circles.
Much has been written about viruses, worms, trojans and other malwares since then, but now
we shift our focus, from fiction to the real world where both malware and anti-malware are big
commercial industries now [Gut07]. As this work is related to malware detection, this chapter
provides a literature survey of the area.
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2.1 Hierarchy
We applied a hierarchical approach to organize the research into a four tier categorization. The
actual detection method sits at the top level of the hierarchy, followed by feature type, analysis
type and detection strategy. This work categorizes the malware detection methods into four broad
categories; scanning, activity monitoring, integrity checking and data mining. File features are the
features extracted from binary programs, analysis type is either static or dynamic, and the detection
type is borrowed from intrusion detection as either misuse or anomaly detection. It provides the
reader with the major advancement in the malware research and categorizes the surveyed work
based upon the above stated hierarchy, which served as the one of the contributions of this research.
2.1.1 Detection Method
The first three categories have been mentioned in previous works, [Spa94], [Bon96]. We have
added data mining as a fourth category. We define the detection mechanism as a two stage process:
data collection and the core detection method. The above defined categories compete for the,
second, core detection part. Otherwise, it is possible that activity monitoring is employed to collect
data and extract features which are later used, either to train a classifier or as signatures in a scanner,
after further processing. Based upon this criteria, we define the four categories as follows:
2.1.1.1 Scanning
Scanning is the most widely used industry standard. Scanning involve searching for strings in files.
The strings being searched are pre-defined virus signatures and support exact matching as well as
wildcards to look for variants of a virus.
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2.1.1.2 Activity Monitoring
Activity Monitoring is the latest trend in virus research where a file execution is monitored for
traces of malicious behavior.
2.1.1.3 Integrity Checking
Integrity Checking creates a cryptographic checksum for each file on a system and periodically
monitors for any variation in that checksum to detect possible changes caused by viruses.
2.1.1.4 Data Mining
Data Mining involves the application of a full suite of statistical and machine learning algorithms
on a set of features derived from malicious and clean programs.
2.1.2 Feature Type
Feature type describes the input data to the malware detection system. The source of this data
serves as a classification criteria for many intrusion and malware detection systems. If the data
source is a workstation, the detection is called Host-Based Detection. If the source is the network,
the detection is termed as Network-Based Detection. Features extracted from programs are used
in a host based detection system. Various reverse engineering techniques at different stages are
applied to extract byte sequences, instruction sequences, API call sequences etc. Network-based
detection systems use network connection records as their data source.
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2.1.2.1 N-grams
An N-gram is a sequence of bytes of fixed or variable length, extracted form the hexadecimal dump
of an executable program. Here, we are using n-grams as a general term for both overlapping and
non-overlapping byte sequences. For the sake of this paper, we define n-grams to remain at a
syntactic level of analysis.
2.1.2.2 API/System calls
An application programming interface (API) is a source code interface that an operating system or
library provides to support requests for services to be made of it by computer programs [api]. For
operating system requests, API is interchangeably termed as system calls. An API call sequences
captures the activity of a program and, hence, is an excellent candidate for mining of any malicious
behavior.
2.1.2.3 Assembly Instructions
In more recent developments, it was emphasized that since n-grams fail to capture the semantics
of the program, instruction sequences should be used instead. Unlike extracting n-grams from
hexdumps, instructions need disassembling the binaries. We define, assembly instruction features
to be instructions of variable and/or fixed lengths extracted from disassembled files.
2.1.2.4 Hybrid Features
A number of techniques used a collection of features, either for different classifiers, or as a hybrid
feature set for the same classifier. The work done by [SEZ01b] used three different features includ-
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ing n-grams, DLL usage information and strings extracted from the binaries. Since this work was
made famous for its usage of n-grams, we finally decided to place it in the n-grams section.
2.1.2.5 Network Connection Records
A network connection record is a set of information, such as duration, protocol type, number of
transmitted bytes etc, which represents a sequence of data flow to and from a well defined source
and target.
2.1.3 Analysis Type
The analysis can be performed at the source code level or at the binary level where only the exe-
cutable program is available. As mentioned by [BDD99], it is unrealistic to assume the availability
of source code for every program. The only choice left are executables with certain legal bindings.
The information from the executables can be gathered either by running them or performing static
reverse engineering or by using both techniques. The reverse engineering method is called Static
Analysis while the process in which the program is actually executed to gather the information is
called Dynamic Analysis. A mixed approach is also utilized if needed.
Static analysis offers information about programs control and data flow and other statistical
features without actually running the program. Several reverse engineering methods are applied
to create an intermediate representation of the binary code. These include disassembling, decom-
piling etc. Once the data is in human readable format, other techniques can be applied for further
analysis. The major advantage of static analysis over its dynamic counterpart is that its free from
the overhead of execution time. The major drawback lies inherently in any static reverse engi-
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neering method being an approximation of the actual execution. At any decision point, it is only
guessed which branch will be taken at the execution time, though the guess is often accurate.
Dynamic analysis require running the program and monitoring its execution in a real or a virtual
machine environment. Though this gives the actual information about the control and data flow,
this approach severely suffers from the execution overhead. A mixed analysis approach is often
used that run portions of the code when static analysis fails to make a proper decision [Sym97].
2.1.4 Detection Strategy
All of these methods involve a matching/mismatching criteria to work. Based upon this criteria the
method can be classified as an anomaly detection, a misuse detection or a hybrid detection method.
Anomaly Detection involves creating a normal profile of the system or programs and checking for
any deviation from that profile. Misuse Detection involves creating a malicious profile in the
form of an exact or heuristic signature and checking for that signature in the programs. Hybrid
Detection does not create any profile but uses data from both clean and malicious programs to
build classifiers. An anomaly detection system looks for mismatches from normal profile, while a
misuse detection system looks for matches for virus signatures.
[SL02] presented an excellent survey of virus and worm research where they cited important
work in virus and worm theory, modeling, analysis and detection. [IM07] offers a taxonomy with
their survey of malware detection research. Besides the hierarchical structure, the classification
presented in this dissertation differs from [IM07] at two points.
• It includes literature describing theory, modeling and analysis besides detection.
• The definition used for dynamic and static analysis is different as [IM07] classified between
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the two approaches based upon the data they are operating on. If it is execution data e.g.
system calls, instructions etc. then the analysis is termed as dynamic whereas static analysis
operates on non execution items e.g. frequencies.
The following sections review virus and worm research literature using the criteria defined
above.
2.2 Scanners
Scanners are the necessary component of every commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) antivirus pro-
gram. As [Szo05] indicated, the scanners have matured from simple string scanning to heuristic
scanning. Nevertheless the concept remains the same. Searching for signatures in the target file.
2.2.1 Static Misuse Detection
Scanning or file scanning as it sometimes referred to, is essentially a static misuse detection tech-
nique. [Szo05] reviewed a number of scanning techniques in his book including string scanning,
that is simply exact string searching, wildcard scanning, that allows for wildcards to cover variants
(signatures with slight modification), smart scanning, that discards garbage instructions to thwart
simple mutations, nearly exact identification, that accompany the primary virus signature with a
secondary one to detect variants, exact identification, that uses as many secondary signatures as
required to detect all the variants in a virus family and heuristic scanning, that scans for malicious
behavior in the form of a series of actions.
As [Bon96] pointed out with the advent of polymorphic viruses, the virus-specific scanners
have exhausted themselves, [Gry99] argued that the new wave in virus detection research will be
23
heuristic scanners.
2.2.2 Hybrid Misuse Detection
[Sym97] used the mixed approach in their Bloodhound technology where they supplement static
analysis with code emulation in their heuristic scanner. The scanner isolate logical region of the
target program and analyze the logic for each region for a virus like behavior.
Symantec’s Striker technology [Sym96] also used code emulation and heuristic scanning to
detect polymorphic viruses. Virus profiles were created for each polymorphic engine and mutation
engine that were based upon behavioral signatures.
2.3 Activity Monitors
Activity monitors use both static and dynamic analysis. Though the term static activity monitoring
carry some sense of being an oxymoron, nevertheless, static analysis make it possible to monitor
the execution of a program without actually running it.
2.3.1 API/System Calls
The most common method to monitor the activity of a program is to monitor the API/system calls
it is making.
2.3.1.1 Static Anomaly Detection
[WD01] proposed a technique that created a control flow graph for a program representing its
system call trace. At execution time this CFG was compared with the system call sequences to
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check for any violation.
2.3.1.2 Hybrid Anomaly Detection
[RKL03] proposed an anomaly based technique where static analysis was assisted by dynamic
analysis to detect injected, dynamically generated and obfuscated code. The static analysis was
used to identify the location of system calls within the program. The programs can be dynamically
monitored later to verify that each observed system call is made from the same location identified
using the static analysis.
2.3.1.3 Static Misuse Detection
[BDE99] used a static misuse detection scheme where they used program slicing to extract program
regions that are critical from a security point of view. Prior to this, the programs were disassem-
bled and converted to an intermediate representation. Once the program slices are obtained, their
behavior was checked against a pre-defined security policy to detect the presence of maliciousness.
In a related work [BDD01] extracted an API call graph instead of the program slices to test
against the security policy. The programs were disassembled first and then an control graph is
created from the disassembly. Next step was to extract the API call graph from the control graph.
[LLO95] proposed the idea of tell-tale signs which were heuristic signatures of malicious pro-
gram behaviors. They created an intermediate representation of the program under investigation
in the form of control flow graph. The CFG was verified against the tell-tale signs to detect any
malicious activity. The approach was implemented in their system called Malicious Code Filter
(MCF).
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[SXC04] implemented signatures in the form of API calls in a technique called Static Anal-
ysis for Vicious Executables (SAVE). The API calls from any program under investigation were
compared against the signature calls using Euclidean distance.
2.3.1.4 Dynamic Anomaly Detection
[HFS98] proposed anomaly detection based upon sequence of system calls. A normal profile
was composed of short sequence of system calls. Hamming distance was used to compare the
sequences of system calls. Large Hamming distances indicated longer sequences and were thus
marked as anomalous.
In a similar approach [SBB01] used Finite State Automata (FSA) to represent system call
sequences. The FSAs were created by executing the programs multiple times and recording the
system calls. Anomalies were detected at runtime when a system call is made that did not have a
transition from a given FSA state.
Similarly [KRL97] proposed an idea of trace policy which was essentially a sequence of system
calls in time. Any deviation from this trace policy was flagged as anomaly. They implemented this
approach in a system called Distributed Program Execution Monitor (DPEM).
[MP05] presented a tool called Dynamic Information Flow Analysis (DIFA) to monitor method
calls at runtime for Java applications. Normal behavior was implemented in the form of an infor-
mation flow policy. Deviations from this policy at runtime were marked as anomalies.
[SB99] created a system call detection engine that compares system calls modeled previously
with the system calls made at runtime. An intermediate representation of a program was captured
in the form of an Auditing Specification Language (ASL). The ASL was compiled into a C++ class
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that was then compiled and linked to create a model of a system call in the system call detection
engine.
2.3.1.5 Hybrid Misuse Detection
[Mor04] presented an approach to detect encrypted and polymorphic viruses using static analysis
and code emulation. The emulation part was implemented to extract system calls information
from encrypted and polymorphic viruses once they are decrypted in the emulation engine. Next
phase is the static analysis that compares the system calls to a manually defined security policy
implemented in the form of Finite State Automata (FSA).
2.3.1.6 Dynamic Misuse Detection
[DGP01] proposed a dynamic monitoring system that enforces a security policy. The approach
was implemented in a system called DaMon.
[Sch98] presented enforceable security policies in the form of Finite State Automata. The
system was monitored at runtime for any violations against the security automata.
2.3.2 Hybrid Features
Some researchers have employed a hybrid set of features for activity monitoring.
2.3.2.1 Static Misuse Detection
[CJS05] created malware signatures using a 3-tuple template of instructions, variables and sym-
bolic constants. An intermediate representation was obtained for any program under investigation.
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Next step converted this intermediate representation to a control flow graph. This control flow
graph was compared against the template control flow graph using a def-use pair. The program
was deemed malicious if a def-use pair for the program under investigation matches a def-use pair
from the template.
2.3.2.2 Dynamic Misuse Detection
[EAA04] proposed a dynamic signature based detection system that used behavioral signatures of
worm operations. The system was monitored at runtime for these signatures. One such signature
described by the authors was a server changing into client. As a worm needs to find other hosts
after infecting a server, it sends request from a server thereby converting to a client. Another
signature checks for same data flow links from in and out of a network node as a worm needs to
send similar data across the network.
2.3.3 Network Data
Malware detection overlaps with intrusion detection if a network based detection mechanism is
used. Activity monitoring can be carried out to monitor network data for traces of a spreading
malware, especially worms.
2.3.3.1 Dynamic Anomaly Detection
[Naz04] discussed different traffic analysis techniques for worm detection. Three schemes were
described for data collection; direct packet capture using tools such as tcpdump, using built-in
SNMP statistics from switches, hubs routers etc. and using flow based exports from routers and
28
switches. The techniques described for dynamic anomaly detection in the network traffic were:
• Growth in traffic volume: An exponential growth in network traffic volume is an indication
of a worm.
• Rise in the number of scans and sweeps: Another anomaly in the normal traffic pattern is the
rise in the number of scan and probe activities which are an indication of a worm scanning
for new targets.
• Change in traffic patterns for some hosts: Worms change the behavior of traffic for some
hosts. A server might start working as a client and start sending requests to other hosts in the
system.
2.4 Integrity Checkers
The main force behind integrity checking programs is to protect programs against any modifica-
tions by viruses. To obtain this, a checksum based upon the program contents is computed and
stored in encrypted form within or outside the program. This checksum is periodically compared
against checksums obtained at later points in time. [Rad92] presented an excellent survey of check-
summing techniques.
2.4.1 Static Anomaly Detection
Integrity checkers are inherently static anomaly detection systems where a checksum of the con-
tents of the program under investigation is compared against a previously obtained checksum. Any
difference would signal an anomaly.
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Cohen argued and demonstrated in [Coh91], [Coh94] that integrity checking of computer files
is the best generic methods.
2.5 Data Mining
Data mining has been the focus of many virus researchers in the recent years to detect unknown
viruses. A number of classifiers have been built and shown to have very high accuracy rates.
The most common method of applying data mining techniques for malware detection start from
generating a feature set. These features include hexadecimal byte sequences (later termed as n-
grams in the paper), instruction sequences, API/system call sequences etc. The number of features
extracted from the files is usually very high. Several techniques from text classification [YP97]
have been employed to select the best features. Some other features include printable strings
extracted from the files and some operating system dependent features such as DLL information.
The following sections provide literature review of data mining techniques used in the virus
detection research. Some of these methods might use activity monitoring as a data collection
method but data mining remains the principal detection method.
2.5.1 N-grams
N-grams is the most common feature used by the data mining methods. Here, we are using n-
grams as a general term for both overlapping and non-overlapping byte sequences. For the sake of
this work, we define n-grams to remain at a syntactic level of analysis.
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2.5.1.1 Dynamic Misuse Detection
The first major work that used data mining techniques for malware research was an automation of
signature extraction for viruses by [KA94]. The viruses were executed in a secured environment
to infect decoy programs. Candidate signatures of variable length were extracted by analyzing the
infected regions in these programs that remained invariant from one program to another. Signatures
with lowest estimated false positive probabilities were chosen as the best signatures. To handle
large, rare sequences, a trigram approach was borrowed from speech recognition where the large
sequence was broken down into trigrams. Then, a simple approximation formula can be used to
estimate the probability of a long sequence by combining the measured frequencies of the shorter
sequences from which it is composed. To measure algorithms effectiveness candidate signatures
were generated and their estimated and actual probabilities were compared. Most of the signatures
fell short of this criteria and were considered bad signatures. Another measure of effectiveness
was false positive record of signatures, which was reported to be minimal. However no numerical
values were provided for estimated and actual probability comparison and false positives.
2.5.1.2 Dynamic Hybrid Detection
This was followed by the pioneering work of [TKS96] where they extended the n-grams analy-
sis to detect boot sector viruses using neural networks. The n-grams were selected based upon
the frequencies of occurrence in viral and benign programs. Feature reduction was obtained by
generating a 4-cover such that each virus in the dataset should have at least 4 of these frequent n-
grams present in order for the n-grams to be included in the dataset. A validation set classification
accuracy of 80-80% was obtained on viral boot sector while clean boot sectors received a 100%
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classification.
In the continuation of their work in [TKS96], [AT00] used n-grams as features to build multiple
neural network classifiers and adopted a voting strategy to predict the final outcome. Their dataset
consisted of 53902 clean files and 72 variant sets of different viruses. For clean files, n-grams were
extracted from the entire file while only those portions of a virus file are considered that remain
constant through different variants of the same virus. A simple threshold pruning algorithm was
used to reduce the number of n-grams to use as features. The results they reported are not very
promising but it still presents a thorough work using neural networks.
2.5.1.3 Static Anomaly Detection
[WS05] proposed a method of classifying various file types based upon their fileprints. An n-gram
analysis method was used and the distribution of n-grams in a file was used as its fileprint. The
distribution was given by byte value frequency distribution and standard deviation. These fileprints
represented the normal profile of the files and were compared against fileprints taken at a later time
using simplified Mahalanobis distance. A large distance indicated a different n-gram distribution
and hence maliciousness.
2.5.1.4 Static Hybrid Detection
The most recent work that brought the data mining techniques for malware detection to the lime-
light was done by [SEZ01b]. They used three different types of features and a variety of classifiers
to detect malicious programs. Their primary dataset contained 3265 malicious and 1001 clean
programs. They applied RIPPER (a rule based system) to the DLL dataset. Strings data was used
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to fit a Naive Bayes classifier while n-grams were used to train a Multi-Naive Bayes classifier with
a voting strategy. No n-gram reduction algorithm was reported to be used. Instead data set par-
titioning was used and 6 Naive-Bayes classifiers were trained on each partition of the data. They
used different features to built different classifiers that do not pose a fair comparison among the
classifiers. Naive-Bayes using strings gave the best accuracy in their model.
Extending the same ideas [SEZ01a], created MEF, Malicious Email Filter, that integrated the
scheme described in [SEZ01b] into a Unix email server. A large dataset consisting of 3301 mali-
cious and 1000 benign programs was used to train and test a Naive-Bayes classifier. N-grams were
extracted by parsing the hexdump output. For feature reduction the dataset was partitioned into
16 subsets. Each subset is independently trained on a different classifier and a voting strategy was
used to obtain the final outcome. The classifier achieved 97.7% detection rate on novel malwares
and 99.8% on known ones. Together with [SEZ01b], this paved the way for a plethora of research
in malware detection using data mining approaches.
A similar approach was used by [KM04], where they built different classifiers including Instance-
based Learner, TFIDF, Naive-Bayes, Support vector machines, Decision tree, boosted Naive-
Bayes, SVMs and boosted decision tree. Their primary dataset consisted of 1971 clean and 1651
malicious programs. Information gain was used to choose top 500 n-grams as features. Best effi-
ciency was reported using the boosted decision tree J48 algorithm.
[ACK04b] created class profiles of various lengths using different n-gram sizes. The class
profile length was defined by the number of most frequent n-grams within the class. These frequent
n-grams from both classes were combined to form, what they termed as relevant n-grams, for each
profile length. Experiments were conducted on a set of 250 benign and 250 malicious programs.
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For classification, Dampster-Shafer theory of Evidence was used to combine SVM, decision tree
and IBK classifiers. They compared their work with [KM04] and reported better results.
In a related work, [ACK04a] used a Common N-Gram classification method to create mal-
ware profile signatures. Similar class profiles of various lengths using different n-gram sizes were
created. The class profile length was defined by the number of most frequent n-grams with their
normalized frequencies. A k-nearest neighbor algorithm was used to match a new profile instance
with a set of already created signature profiles. They experimented with combinations of different
profile lengths and different n-gram sizes. A five-fold cross validation method gave 91% classifi-
cation accuracy.
Building upon their previous work in [Yoo04], [YU06] experimented with a larger data col-
lection with 790 infected and 80 benign files, thus landing in our static hybrid detection category.
N-grams were extracted from octal dump of the program, instead of usual hexdump and then
converted to short integer values for SOM input. Using the SOM algorithms, VirusDetector was
created that was used as a detection tool, instead of a visualization tool. VirusDetector achieved
an 84% detection with a 30% false positive rate. the technique is able to cater polymorphic and
encrypted viruses.
In a recent n-grams based static hybrid detection approach [HJ06] used intra-family and inter-
family support to select and reduce the number of features. First, the most frequent n-grams within
each virus family were selected. Then the list was pruned to contain only those features that have
a support threshold higher than a given value amongst these families. This was done for various n-
gram sizes. Experiments were carried out on a set of 3000 programs, 1552 of which were viruses,
belonging to 110 families, and 1448 were benign programs. With ID3, J4 decision tree, Naive
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Bayes and SMO classifiers, they compared their results with [SEZ01b] and claimed better overall
efficiency. In search of optimal feature selection criteria, they experimented with different n-gram
sizes and various values of intra-family and inter-family selection thresholds. They reported better
results with shorter sequences. For longer sequences, a low inter-family threshold gave better
performance. Better performance was also noted, when features were in excess of 200.
2.5.1.5 Static Misuse Detection
[Yoo04] presented a static misuse method to detect viruses using self organizing maps (SOM).
They claimed that each virus has its own DNA like character that changes the SOM projection
of the program that it infects. N-grams were extracted from the infected programs and SOMs
were trained on this data. Since the method only looks for change in the SOM projection as a
result of virus infection, it is able to detect polymorphic and metamorphic malwares, even in the
encrypted state. Experiments were performed on a small set of 14 viral samples. The algorithm
was successfully able to detect virus patterns in the infected files.
2.5.2 API/System calls
Though API/system call monitoring is the most common method in activity monitoring systems, a
number of data mining methods also employ these, to build classifiers.
2.5.2.1 Dynamic Anomaly Detection
[MS05] added a temporal element to the system call frequency and calculated the frequency of
system call sequences within a specific time window. These windows were generated for inde-
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pendent peers and a correlation among them indicated a fast spreading worm. Similarity measures
were calculated using edit distance on ordered sets of system calls windows and intersection on
unordered sets. These similarity measures gave the probabilities of two peers running the same
worm invoking the same system call sequence in a given time window. The technique works well
for polymorphic worms.
2.5.2.2 Static Hybrid Detection
In the malware detection realm, the most important work using API sequences was done by
[SXC04]. They created a signature based detection system called Static Analyzer of Vicious Exe-
cutables (SAVE) that compares API sequences extracted from programs to sequences from a sig-
nature database. For matching cosine measure, extended Jaccard measure and Pearson correlation
measures were used. Final outcome was the mean of all three measures. Using these statistical
measures for similarity enables SAVE to capture polymorphic and metamorphic malwares, for
which, traditional signature detection system are deemed incapable of.
In a recent approach using API execution sequences, [YWL07] developed Intelligent Malware
Detection System (IMDS). IMDS used Objective-Oriented Association (OOA) mining based clas-
sification and is composed of a PE parser, an OOA rule generator and a rule based classifier. For
rule generation, they developed a OOA Fast FP-Growth algorithm, an extension of FP-Growth
algorithm, and claimed better performance than the Apriori algorithm for association rule genera-
tion. The experiments were conducted on a large data set consisted of 17366 malicious and 12214
benign executables. For detection, a Classification Based on Association rules (CBA) technique
was used. They compared their results with popular anti-virus programs like Norton, McAfee, Dr
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Webb and Kaspersky and claimed better efficiency on polymorphic and unknown virus detection.
The IMDS was able to detect all the polymorphic viruses and 92% of the unknown viruses. For
polymorphic virus detection a different dataset was created where for each virus a set of polymor-
phic versions were generated. IMDS was also compared with Naive-Bayes, J48 decision tree and
SVM classifiers and proved to churn out better detection and false positive rates. A smaller dataset
was sampled from the collection for this comparison.
2.5.3 Assembly Instructions
The first major work to include instructions in its features was Portable Executable Analysis Tool
(PEAT) [WSS02]. PEAT used a number of other features also, so it will be explained in detail
in the Hybrid Features section. Similarly [MKT07] used instruction sequences along with other
features and will be discussed in the Hybrid Features section.
2.5.3.1 Static Misuse Detection
[KWL05] created a malware phylogeny using permutation of code. They extracted instruction se-
quences of fixed length (termed as n-grams in their paper) and created two datasets. First dataset
contained all the n-grams while the second dataset featured n-perms, all possible permutations of
the n-grams in the first dataset. Similarity scores were calculated using a combination of TFxIDF
weighting and cosine similarity measures. Clustering on these similarity scores provided the phy-
logeny model. To measure the effectiveness of each feature set, an experiment was conducted on
a small data collection of 170 samples. The results showed that n-perms produce higher similarity
scores for permuted programs and produce comparable phylogeny models. A study was conducted
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to explore how the generated malware phylogeny can be used in naming and classification of mal-
wares. Using a small dataset of 15 samples including an unknown malware, the created phylogeny
model successfully identified the unknown malware family. The phylogeny model was also able
to identify naming inconsistencies for names assigned by commercial antiviruses.
2.5.3.2 Static Hybrid Detection
Another recent work that solely used variable length instruction sequences, was [SWL08]. After
disassembly, instruction sequences were selected based upon the frequency of occurrence in the
entire dataset. A Chi-Square test was performed for feature reduction. They built logistic regres-
sion, neural network and decision tree models and reported 98.4% detection rate with decision tree
model.
2.5.4 Hybrid Features
A number of techniques used a collection of features, either for different classifiers, or as a hybrid
feature set for the same classifier. The work done by [SEZ01b] used three different features includ-
ing n-grams, DLL usage information and strings extracted from the binaries. Since this work was
made famous for its usage of n-grams, we finally decided to place it in the n-grams section.
2.5.4.1 Static Anomaly Detection
[WSS02] developed PEAT (The Portable Executable Analysis Tool) to detect structural anomalies
inside a program. PEAT rested on the basic principle that the inserted code in a program disrupts
its structural integrity and hence by using statistical attributes and visualization tools this can be
38
detected. The visualization tools plot the probability of finding some specific subject of interest in
a particular area of the program. These subjects include sequence of bytes, their ASCII represen-
tation, their disassembly representation and memory access via register offsets. Statistical analysis
was done on instruction frequencies, instruction patterns, register offsets, jump and call offsets, en-
tropy of opcode values and code and ASCII probabilities. The experimental results were provided
for only one malicious program.
2.5.4.2 Static Hybrid Detection
[MKT07] created a hybrid feature set using n-grams, instruction sequences and API calls. For
feature selection, Information Gain was used. They experimented with two non-disjoint datasets.
The first dataset contains a collection of 1,435 executables, 597 of which are benign and 838
are malicious. The second dataset contains 2,452 executables, having 1,370 benign and 1,082
malicious executables. In addition to the hybrid feature set (HFS), two other datasets were also
created using n-grams (BFS) and assembly features (AFS). The accuracy of each of the feature
sets was tested by applying a three-fold cross validation using classifiers such as SVM, decision
tree, Naive Bayes, Bayes Net and Boosted decision tree. Experiments were performed for different
n-gram sizes. For the first dataset, best efficiency was reported for HFS using an n-gram size of
6, resulting in 97.4% classification accuracy. HFS performed better for the second dataset too. To
compare classification accuracies of the HFS and BFS, a pairwise two-tailed t-test was performed.
The test statistically proved that HFS performed slightly better than BFS.
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2.5.4.3 Hybrid Hybrid Detection
[WHS06] presented a surveillance spyware detection system that used APIs and DLL usage infor-
mation and changes in registry, system files/folders and network states to detect spywares. They
collected 1147 samples over a period of time to experiment with. Information Gain and SVM runs
were used for feature selection. An SVM was used to classify spywares from benign programs.




This chapter provides a description of, the much required, theoretical foundation for our work and
the general framework that we developed to carry out our experiments.
3.1 Research Contribution
[Kan02] describes the data mining process to be consisted of five steps.





Once the problem was clearly stated as the malware detection problem, one of the main contri-
butions of this work comes from the data collection step. We introduce the idea of using variable
length instructions sequence, extracted from binary files as the primary classification feature. Un-
like fixed length instructions or n-grams, the variable length instructions inherently capture the
programs control flow information as each sequence reflects a control flow block.
The difference among our approach and other static analysis approaches mentioned in the re-
lated research section are as follows.
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The framework we developed, used applied data mining as a complete process from problem
statement to the model interpretation step. [Bon93] discussed the importance of maintaining a
clean virus collection for research. We subjected the data to a malware analysis process where
thousands of malwares as well as clean files were analyzed for corrupt and duplicate elements
and packed, encrypted, polymorphic and metamorphic forms. Although data preparation is a very
important step in a data mining process, most of the existing static analysis techniques mentioned in
the 2 chapter did not discuss this step in detail except [WSS02]. Also, all features were sequences
of instructions extracted by the disassembly instead of using fixed length of bytes such as n-gram.
The advantages are:
1. The instruction sequences include program control flow information, not present in n-grams.
2. The instruction sequences capture information from the program at a semantic level rather
than syntactic level.
3. These instruction sequences can be traced back to their original location in the program for
further analysis of their associated operations.
4. The variable length instruction sequences inherently result in a smaller feature set as com-
pared to n-grams.
5. A significant number of sequences that appeared in only clean program or malwares can be
eliminated to speed up the modeling process.
6. The classifier obtained can achieve more than 98% detection rate for new and unseen mal-
wares.
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7. Instruction sequences are a domain-independent feature and the technique can be used with-
out any modification to detect every type of malwares including virus, trojans, spywares
etc.
The last four points have been experimentally proven in this work. It is worth noting that a
dataset prepared for a neural network classifier might not be suitable for other data mining tech-
niques such as decision tree or random forest. In this work, we compared different feature selection
methods and different classifiers for optimum performance.
3.2 Learning Theory
The particular problem of labeling a program as malware or clean is an example of the general
classification problem, which in turn belongs to a wider class of dependency estimation problems.
Learning theory describes one approach to such problems. The process of learning from data
manifests itself in two general steps.
• Learning or estimating dependencies, from given input data samples
• Using the estimated dependencies to predict output for new data samples
In the terms of statistical inference, the first step is referred to as induction (progressing from
particular cases of input values to a general model), while the second step is deduction (progressing
from a general model to particular cases of output values) [Kan02].
These two steps are implemented in a learning machine. The implementation details differ, but
the main task is to learn from given data samples by searching through an n-dimensional space to
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form an acceptable generalization. The inductive learning, thus, takes the form of finding a func-
tion that estimates the dependencies in the data. More formally, given a collection of samples (xi,
f(x)i), the inductive learning process returns a function h(x) that approximates f(x). The approxi-
mating function can be defined in terms of its internal parameters, and a more precise form can be
expressed as h(X, w), where X is the input vector and w is the functions parameters. The quality
of the approximation can be measured in terms of a function that can compare the output produced
by the learning machine to the actual output. Such a function is called the loss function L(y, h(X,
w)), where y is the actual output of the system, X is the set of inputs, w is the parameters of the
approximation function, h(X, w) is the output produced by the learning machine using X as inputs
and w as internal parameters.
The expected value of the loss function is called the risk functional R(w)
R(w) =
∫ ∫
L(y, h(X,w))p(X, y)dXdy (3.1)
where L(y, h(X, w)) is the loss function and p(X, y) is the unknown probability distribution
of the input X. Inductive learning can be redefined as the process of estimating the function h(X,
wopt) that minimizes R(w), over the set of functions supported by the learning machine and using
only the input data and not knowing the probability distribution p(X, y).
3.3 Vector Space Model
We used the vector space model to create our feature set. In information retrieval, a vector space
model defines documents as vectors (or points) in a multidimensional Euclidean space where the
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axes (dimensions) are represented by terms. Depending upon the the type of vector components
(coordinates), there are three basic versions of this representation: Boolean, term frequency (TF)
and term frequency - inverse document frequency (TFIDF), [ML07]. In our case, the programs
and instruction sequences mapped to documents and terms, respectively. Using these program
vectors, we created a term-document matrix where programs were arranged in rows, while columns
represent the potential features (instruction sequences). For feature selection we used boolean
representation of the matrix, where a 1 represented presence, while 0 represented absence, of an
instruction sequence in a given program. Assume there are n programs p1, p2, ... pn, and m
instruction sequences s1, s2, ..., sm. Let ni j be the number of times a sequence si was found in a
program p j. In the boolean representation a program p j is represented as an m component vector,
p j = p1j , p
2





0 if ni j = 0
1 if ni j > 0
(3.2)
Using the boolean definition of pij, let Ni j be the total number of times a sequence si was present





In order to be selected, a sequence si, must have its Ni j greater than a defined threshold. This
threshold was set to 10% of the total number of the programs, as it is a common practice in data







We used an array of classification models in our experiments. The foundation of the inductive
learning implemented in these models has been discussed in the learning theory section. Here, a
short description of each of these models is provided.
3.4.1 Logistic Regression
Regression is a statistical technique that determines the best model that can relate an independent
variable to various independent variables. Logistic regression is the type of regression that tries to
estimate the probability that the dependent variable will have a given value, instead of estimating
the value of the variable.
3.4.2 Neural Network
A neural network is a network of simple processing elements (neurons) that can exhibit complex
global behavior, determined by the connections between the processing elements and element pa-
rameters. It can be used to model complex nonlinear relationship between inputs and outputs by




A decision tree recursively partitions the predictor space to model the relationship between pre-
dictor variables and categorical response variable. Using a set of input-output samples a tree is
constructed. The learning system adopts a top-down approach that searches for a solution in a part
of the search space. Traversing the resultant tree gives a set of rules that finally classified each
observation into the given classes.
3.4.4 Support Vector Machines
SVMs are set of tools for finding the optimal hyperplane that separates the linear or non-linear
data into two categories [Web05]. The separating hyperplane is the hyperplane that maximizes the
distance (margin) between the two parallel hyperplanes. The non-linear classification is obtained
by applying a kernel function to these maximum-margin hyperplanes.
3.4.5 Bagging
Bagging or Bootstrap Aggregating is a meta-algorithm to improve classification and regression
models in terms of accuracy and stability. Bagging generates multiple versions of a classifier and
uses plurality vote to decide for the final class outcome among the versions. The multiple versions
are created using bootstrap replications of the original dataset. Bagging can give substantial gains
in accuracy by improving on the instability of individual classifiers. [Bre96]
47
3.4.6 Random Forest
Random forest provides a degree of improvement over Bagging by minimizing correlation between
classifiers in the ensemble. This is achieved by using bootstrapping to generate multiple versions
of a classifier as in Bagging but employing only a random subset of the variables to split at each
node, instead of all the variables as in Bagging. Using a random selection of features to split each
node yields error rates that compare favorably to Adaboost, but are more robust with respect to
noise.[Bre01]
Besides classification, random forest also gives the important variables used in the model. The
importance is calculated as the mean decrease in accuracy or mean decrease in Gini index if the
variable is removed from the model.
3.4.7 Principal Component Analysis
Another technique that was used for feature reduction in our experiments was Principal Component
Analysis (PCA). PCA is a technique used to reduce multidimensional data sets to lower dimensions
for analysis. PCA involves the calculation of the eigenvalues that represent the linear combination
of original variables such that the lower order eigenvalues explain most of the variance in the data.
3.5 Performance Criteria
We tested the models using the test data. Confusion matrices were created for each classifier using
the actual and predicted responses. The following four estimates define the members of the matrix.
True Positive (TP): Number of correctly identified malicious programs.
False Positive (FP): Number of wrongly identified benign programs.
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True Negative (TN): Number of correctly identified benign programs.
False Negative (FN): Number of wrongly identified malicious programs.
The performance of each classifier was evaluated using the detection rate, false alarm rate and
overall accuracy that can be defined as follows:
Detection Rate: Percentage of correctly identified malicious programs.
DetectionRate = T PT P+FN
False Alarm Rate: Percentage of wrongly identified benign programs.
FalseAlarmRate = FPT N+FP
Overall Accuracy: Percentage of correctly identified programs.




This chapter describes the experiments that are distinguished by the use of supervised learning al-
gorithms on a collection of datasets that used the frequency of occurrence of a feature as a primary
selection criterion. In principle, our approach is similar to other data mining approaches described
in the previous chapter. Our major contribution comes from the unique set of features that we iden-
tified by analyzing the malware samples and the application of data mining as a complete process
from problem statement and data collection to model interpretation and drawing conclusions. In
these experiments we worked with different malware types and compared different classification
and feature selection methods. We also compared our feature type with other the most common
feature type, used in data mining for malware detection research.
The basic unit of our analysis is a computer file. A file can be defined as a block of arbitrary
information, or resource for storing information that is available to a computer program. Based
upon the contents, files can be divided into two major categories; data files, that store information
and executable files, that are composed of a collection of instructions describing some task, to be
carried out by a computer. In terms of files, a computer program consists of at least an executable
file supplemented by a collection of data files. As malware are mostly identified as programs, they
necessarily consist of an executable file. Worms, trojans, spywares etc. are stand alone programs
while viruses are injected into other executable programs making them malicious.
Our research deals with Windows malwares only. The executable file for Windows is called PE
(Portable Executable) [Cor99], that defines the format of the file. Figure 4.1 displays the layout of
a PE file.
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Figure 4.1: Typical 32-Bit Portable .EXE File Layout
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In a more simplified form the PE file can be considered as consisting of two main portions;
header and body. Header contains information about the file including statistics e.g. number of
sections, starting address etc. while body contains the actual contents of the file.
We performed experiments with three types of malwares; virus, trojan and worm. The fol-
lowing sections describe experiments with each of these malwares types. First section describes
experiment with a subset containing all three types. Next sections are dedicated to trojans and
worms only.
4.1 Subset Data
The initial experiment was carried out to build a data mining framework. Once the framework was
built, experiments with large collection of malwares were carried out.
4.1.1 Data Processing
The dataset consisted of 820 Windows PE files. Half of them were malicious and the other half
consisted of clean programs. The clean programs were obtained from a PC running Windows XP.
Each malicious program in our dataset belongs to one of the three main categories of virus, worm
and trojan. The virus files were mostly small windows application programs such as notepad, calc,
wordpad, and paint etc, infected with different types of viruses and their variants. We only con-
sidered Win32 malwares. The dataset did not contain any encrypted, polymorphic or metamorphic
viruses, as the static disassembly analysis of a virus in its encrypted form would be meaningless as
any other infection would contain a mutated copy of the virus with different instructions perform-
ing the same malicious task. Figure 4.6 displays the data preprocessing steps.
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Figure 4.2: Portion of the output of disassembled actmovie.exe.
4.1.1.1 Malware Analysis
[Bon93] discussed the importance of maintaining a clean virus collection for research. We purged
our collection of corrupt and duplicate files. Next the samples were categorized based upon the
malware type (virus, worm, trojan etc), concealment strategy (no concealment, encryption, poly-
morphism etc.) and in memory strategy (memory resident, non memory resident).
4.1.1.2 Disassembly
For further analysis the binaries were transformed to an intermediate representation. This trans-
formation was obtained by applying reverse engineering to the binaries. The intermediate repre-
sentation thus obtained was in the form of assembly language code using a disassembly program.
The disassembly was obtained using Datarescues’ IDA Pro [IDA]. From these disassembled files
we extracted the variable length instruction sequences that served as the primary source for the
features in our dataset. We only considered the opcode and the operands were discarded from the
analysis. Figure 4.2 shows a portion of the disassembly of the program actmovie.exe.
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Figure 4.3: Instruction sequences extracted from actmovie.exe
4.1.1.3 Parsing
The disassembly in figure 4.2 was parsed to create the instruction sequences. Figure 4.3 displays
the sequences obtained from the disassembled portion shown in figure 4.2. Each row in figure 4.3
represents a single instruction sequence. The first column indicates if it is a clean file or malware,
second column carries the file name. Third column carries the sequence name that the parser
assigned to it. From fourth column and on, the instruction sequence starts.
4.1.1.4 Feature Extraction
The raw disassembly of the virus and clean files resulted in 1510421 sequences. Among them
62608 unique sequences were identified with different frequencies of occurrence. Each sequence
was considered as a potential feature. Figure 4.4 displays the scatter plot of sequence frequencies
and the number of times those frequencies were spotted in the files. Points close to Y-axis are rare
sequences while the points close to X-axis and on the farther right corner of the plot represents the
most occurring sequences. Figure 4.5 displays the same plot with outliers removed. This shows
the actual operating region from where the dataset can be built. Rare sequences will reduce the
classifier to a signature detection engine while the ones that are too frequent cannot be used as
identifiers.
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Figure 4.4: Scatter plot of sequence frequencies and their frequency of occurrence.




























Figure 4.6: Data preprocessing steps for experiments with the malware subset.
4.1.1.5 Feature Selection
We used the vector space model to transform the unstructured data into a structured form. Each
program was considered a vector in a n dimensional space where n was the number of distinct
instruction sequences. A term document matrix was created where each program represented a
document, while instruction sequences were considered as terms. Using the unary variable removal
method described in the section 3.3, we selected the most important instruction sequences. This
removed 98.2% of the sequences and only 1134 sequences were selected. After the removal, the
term document matrix contained the term frequency representation of the model. A binary target
variable identified each program as malware or clean.
4.1.1.6 Independence Test
A Chi-Square test of independence was performed for each feature to determine if a relationship
exists between the feature and the target variable. The term document matrix was transformed to a
binary representation to get a 2-way contingency table. Using a p-value of 0.01 for the test resulted
in the removal of about half of the features that did not showed any statistically significant relation-
ship with the target. Features that have their entire occurrence in one class only are also removed
from the analysis, as they tend to bias the classifier. Out of initial 1134 features, 633 remained
after this step. Some features have too many levels to implement data mining methods such as
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logistic regression and neural networks efficiently. An m-to-n mapping was used by applying the
ChiMerge technique to collapse the number of levels within a feature.
4.1.2 Experiments
The data was partitioned into 70% training and 30% test data. We fitted three models to the training
data using SAS Enterprise Miner. These include logistic regression, neural networks and decision
trees.
4.1.2.1 Logistic Regression
Logistic regression model was used to calculate the posterior probabilities that a given observation
belonged to malicious class or benign. In the Enterprise Miner implementation of logistic regres-
sion, we only considered main effects due large number of input features. Two-factor interactions
and polynomial terms were not considered.
4.1.2.2 Neural Network
Neural network model was used to learn to classify between malicious and benign class by repeti-
tively presenting observations from both classes. The model used MLP architecture with 10 hidden
units and misclassification as the model selection criteria.
4.1.2.3 Decision Tree
Decision tree model was used to obtain a set of rules that can classify each sample into either
malicious or benign class. The decision tree model we used in Enterprise Miner used entropy as
split criterion with a maximum depth of 30.
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Figure 4.7: ROC curve comparing regression, neural network and decision tree training results.
Figure 4.7 displays the training ROC curves for each model.
4.1.3 Results
The models were tested on the 30% test data that we set aside before the experiments. The test data
contain the malwares and clean programs that were not part of the model fitting process. In data
mining terms it was scoring data, while in the malware research terminology, this set contained
new and unknown malwares.
Table 4.1 displays the experimental results for each classifier.
Figure 4.8 displays the ROC curves for test data for each model. The slight bent in the curve for
decision tree exhibits that the classifier was more prone to false positive rate although it displayed
a slightly better detection rate. Neural network gave a slightly better false positive rate with a
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Table 4.1: Experimental results for new and unknown viruses.
Classifier Detection Rate False Alarm Rate Overall Accuracy
Logistic Regression 95% 17.5% 88.6%
Neural Network 97.6% 4.1% 97.6%
Decision Tree 98.4% 4.9% 96.7%
Figure 4.8: ROC curve comparing regression, neural network and decision tree test results.
less detection rate. Logistic regression didn’t perform well on the test data as the ROC curve for
training displayed overfitting for the model. Table 4.2 displays the area under the ROC curve for
each model.
4.2 Trojans
Our decision to exclusively use trojans in an experiment was based upon last year’s malware dis-
tribution statistics. Figure 4.9 displays the 2007 malware distribution statistics from Trend Micro.
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Figure 4.9: 2007 Malware distribution statistics from Trend Micro.
The number of trojans in each quarter is equal to or more than the number of any other malware
type including worms.
4.2.1 Data Processing
Our collection of trojans and clean programs consisted of 4722 Windows PE files, of which 3000
were trojans and the 1722 were clean programs. The clean programs were obtained from a PC run-
ning Windows XP. These include small Windows applications such as calc, notepad, etc and other
application programs running on the machine. A number of clean programs were also downloaded
from [Dow] to get a representation of programs downloaded from the Internet. The trojans were all
downloaded from [vx]. The dataset was thus consisted of a wide range of programs, created using
different compilers and resulting in a sample set of uniform representation. Figure 4.12 displays
the data processing steps.
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Table 4.3: Packers/Compilers Analysis of Trojans





Other Not Packed 229 597




Table 4.4: Packers/Compilers Analysis of Trojans and Clean Programs
Type of Program Not Packed Packed Unidentified
Clean 1573 77 72
Trojan 1691 1135 174
Total 3264 1212 246
4.2.1.1 Malware Analysis
We ran PEiD [PEi] on our data collection to detect compilers, common packers and cryptors, used
to compile and/or modify the programs. Table 4.3 displays the distribution of different packers and
compilers in the collection. Table 4.4 displays the summary of packed, not packed and unidentified
trojans and clean programs.
Before further processing, packed programs were unpacked using specific unpackers such as
UPX (with -d switch) [UPX], and generic unpackers such as Generic Unpacker Win32 [GUW] and
VMUnpacker [VMU].
4.2.1.2 File Size Analysis
Before disassembling the programs to extract instruction sequences, a file size analysis was per-
formed to ensure that the number of instructions extracted from clean programs and trojans is
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Table 4.5: File Size Analysis of the Program Collection





approximately equal. Table 4.5 displays the file size statistics for trojans and clean programs.
To get an even distribution of the number of programs in the collection, we finally chose 1617
trojans and 1544 clean programs after discarding unidentified programs and large trojans that were
pulling the average program size a little higher than the clean programs.
4.2.1.3 Disassembly
Binaries were transformed to a disassembly representation that is parsed to extract features. The
disassembly was obtained using Datarescues’ IDA Pro [IDA]. From these disassembled files we
extracted sequences of instructions that served as the primary source for the features in our dataset.
A sequence is defined as instructions in succession until a conditional or unconditional branch in-
struction and/or a function boundary is reached. Instruction sequences thus obtained are of various
lengths. We only considered the opcode and the operands were discarded from the analysis. Figure
4.10 shows a portion of the disassembly of the Win32.Flood.A trojan.
4.2.1.4 Parsing
A parser written in PHP translates the disassembly in figure 4.10 to instruction sequences. Figure
4.11 displays the output of the parser. Each row in the parsed output represented a single instruction
sequence. The raw disassembly of the trojan and clean programs resulted in 10067320 instruction
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Figure 4.10: Portion of the output of disassembled Win32.Flood.A trojan.
Figure 4.11: Instruction sequences extracted from the disassembled Win32.Flood.A trojan.
sequences.
4.2.1.5 Feature Extraction
The parsed output was processed through our Feature Extraction Mechanism. Among the 10067320
instruction sequences, 2962589 unique sequences were identified with different frequencies of oc-
currence. We removed the sequences that were found in one class only as they will reduce the
classifier to a signature detection technique.
4.2.1.6 Primary Feature Selection
We used the vector space model to transform the unstructured data into a structured form. Each
program was considered a vector in a n dimensional space where n was the number of distinct
instruction sequences. A term document matrix was created where each program represented a





































Figure 4.12: Data preprocessing steps for experiments with trojans.
method described in the section 3.3, we selected the most important instruction sequences. This
removed 97% of the sequences and only 955 sequences were selected. After the removal, the
term document matrix contained the term frequency representation of the model. A binary target
variable identified each program as trojan or clean.
4.2.1.7 Independence Test
A Chi-Square test of independence was performed for each feature to determine if a relationship
exists between the feature and the target variable. The term document matrix was transformed
to a binary representation to get a 2-way contingency table. Using a p-value of 0.01 for the test
resulted in the removal of about half of the features that did not showed any statistically significant
relationship with the target. The resulting number of variables after this step was 877.
4.2.1.8 Secondary Feature Selection/Reduction
After performing the primary feature selection and independence test, we applied two more feature
selection/reduction algorithms to create three different datasets. These algorithms include random
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forest and principal component analysis. The first dataset retained all the original 877 variables. In
the results section 4.2.3, this set is referred to as All variables.
Random Forest: While using the random forest model for feature selection, we rejected the
variables for which the mean decrease in accuracy was less than 10%. Only 84 variables were
selected. In the results section 4.2.3, this set is referred to as RF variables.
Principal Component Analysis: During the PCA feature reduction process, we obtained the
146 variables that explained 95% variance in the dataset and rejected others. In the results section
4.2.3, this set is referred to as PCA variables.
4.2.2 Experiments
The data was partitioned into 70% training and 30% test data. Similar experiments showed best
results with tree based models for the count data [SWL08]. We built bagging and random forest
models using R [R]. We also experimented with SVMs using R.
4.2.2.1 Bagging
Classification trees were used with 100 bootstrap replications in the Bagging model.
4.2.2.2 Random Forest
We grew 100 classification trees in the random forest model. The number of variables sampled at
each split was ranged from 6 to 43 depending upon the number of variables in the dataset.
4.2.2.3 Support Vector Machines
We used C-Classification with a radial basis kernel function.
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Table 4.6: Experimental results for new and unknown trojans.
Classifier Variables Detection Rate False Alarm Rate Overall Accuracy
Random Forest All 93.1% 6.3% 92.6%
Random Forest RF 92.4% 9.2% 94.0%
Random Forest PCA 89.7% 10.1% 89.6%
Bagging All 91.1% 7.4% 89.8%
Bagging RF 91.1% 9.6% 91.9%
Bagging PCA 89.4% 10.5% 89.4%
SVM All 83.6% 15.0% 82.6%
SVM RF 83.3% 12.3% 79.7%























Figure 4.13: ROC curve comparing random forest test results on datasets with all variables, RF
variables and PCA variables.
4.2.3 Results
Like, in the experiments described in the previous section, we tested the models using the 30%test
data. Table 4.6 displays the experimental results for each classifier over the three training sets.
4.2.4 Discussion
Random forest stood out to be the winner among all the classifiers and dimension reduction meth-
























Figure 4.14: ROC curve comparing random forest, bagging and SVM test results on dataset with
RF selection.
Table 4.7: Area under the ROC curve for each classifier for each dataset.
Classifier Variables AUC
Random Forest All 0.9772
Random Forest RF 0.9754








the ROC curve were obtained using random forest classifier on all the variables. The best detec-
tion rate was obtained using random forest model with feature selection using a previous run of
random forest. This comes with a slight sacrifice in overall accuracy but a much simpler model.
Tree based method performed better on the count data. More specifically random forest performed
slightly better than Bagging which is an endorsement of its superiority over Bagging as claimed
in [Bre01]. ROC curves are provided to compare results for each classifier and each dataset. For
space considerations, we are only providing ROC curves for RF Dimensions dataset for each clas-
sifier in figure 4.13. To compare the results over each dataset figure 4.14 displays ROC curve for
random forest test results for the three datasets.
4.3 Worms
Worms claim more damage to the economy than any other type of malware. In the recent years the
most notable malwares were mostly worms including Melissa, ILoveYou, Code Red I & II, Nimda,
SQL Slammer, Blaster, SoBig, Sober, MyDoom, Witty and Sasser worms. The same framework
that we developed for trojans and viruses was extended to include worms.
4.3.1 Data Processing
Our collection of 3195 Windows PE files consisted of 1473 worms and 1722 clean programs. The
clean programs were obtained from a PC running Windows XP. These include small Windows
applications such as calc, notepad, etc and other application programs running on the machine.
A number of clean programs were also downloaded from [Dow] to get a representation of down-
loaded programs. The worms were downloaded from [vx]. The dataset was thus consisted of a
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Table 4.8: Packers/Compilers Analysis Details of Worms and Clean Programs
Before Unpacking After Unpacking
Packer/Compiler Worms Cleans Worms Cleans
ASPack 79 2 1 0
Borland 118 39 258 45
FSG 31 1 3 0
Microsoft 350 937 649 976
Other Not Packed 205 597 234 601
Other Packed 104 24 135 28
PECompact 26 2 7 0
Unidentified 161 72 161 72
UPX 399 48 24 0
Total 1473 1722 1473 1722
Table 4.9: Packers/Compilers Analysis Summary of Worms and Clean Programs
Before Unpacking After Unpacking
Packer/Compiler Worms Cleans Worms Cleans
Not Packed 672 1573 1140 1622
Packed 640 77 171 28
Unidentified 161 72 162 72
Total 1473 1722 1473 1722
wide range of programs, created using different compilers and resulting in a sample set of uniform
representation. Figure 4.17 displays the data processing steps.
4.3.1.1 Malware Analysis
We ran PEiD [PEi] on our data collection to detect compilers, common packers and cryptors, used
to compile and/or modify the programs. Table 4.8 displays the distribution of different packers
and compilers in the collection. Before further processing, packed programs were unpacked using
specific unpackers such as UPX (with -d switch) [UPX], and generic unpackers such as Generic
Unpacker Win32 [GUW] and VMUnpacker [VMU]. Table 4.9 displays the summary of packed,
not packed and unidentified trojans and clean programs.
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Figure 4.15: Portion of the output of disassembled Netsky.A worm.
A number of clean programs were removed to keep an equal class distribution. The unidentified
programs were also removed.
4.3.1.2 Disassembly
Binaries were disassembled to obtain a source code representation using Datarescues’ IDA Pro
[IDA]. Programs with disassembly errors were removed from the dataset.
4.3.1.3 Feature Extraction
The core of the Feature Extraction Mechanism consisted of a parser that parsed the disassembled
files to generate instruction sequences. A sequence is defined as instructions in succession until a
conditional or unconditional branch instruction and/or a function boundary is reached. Instruction
sequences thus obtained are of various lengths. We only considered the opcode and the operands
were discarded from the analysis. Figure 4.15 shows a portion of the disassembly of the Netsky.A
worm.
The parser was written in PHP and it translated the disassembly in figure 4.15 to instruction
sequences. Figure 4.16 displays the output of the parser. Each row in the parsed output represented
a single instruction sequence. For comparison purposes we also extracted non-overlapping fixed
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Figure 4.17: Data preprocessing steps for experiments with worms.
length instruction sequences from the disassembly. These fixed length sequences will be termed
n-grams in this paper, where n is the length of the sequence. The value of n was varied from 2 to
10 in our experiments.
4.3.1.4 Feature Selection/Reduction
We used the vector space model to transform the unstructured data into a structured form. Each
program was considered a vector in a n dimensional space where n was the number of distinct
instruction sequences. A term document matrix was created where each program represented a
document, while instruction sequences were considered as terms. Using the unary variable removal
method described in the section 3.3, we selected the most important instruction sequences. After
the removal, the term document matrix contained the term frequency representation of the model.
A binary target variable identified each program as worm or clean. We also added a heuristic flag
variable indicating if the worm or clean program was originally found in a packed or an unpacked
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Table 4.10: Features Statistics
No of Features
Feature Size Total Distinct 10% Presence Ind. Test
2 16365620 6728 630 537
3 10910413 45867 1583 1334
4 8182810 156572 1823 1483
5 6546248 361715 1771 1466
Variable 5487145 509778 574 492
6 5455206 640863 1114 906
7 4675891 949233 458 363
8 4091405 1236822 112 71
9 3636804 1474690 37 27
10 3273124 1618698 20 15
state.
4.3.1.5 Independence Test
A Chi-Square test of independence was performed for each feature to determine if a relationship
exists between the feature and the target variable. The term document matrix was transformed
to a binary representation to get a 2-way contingency table. Using a p-value of 0.01 for the test
resulted in the removal of about half of the features that did not showed any statistically significant
relationship with the target.
Table 4.10 displays the features statistics for datasets generated for each n-gram size and the
variable length instruction sequences. Each n-gram or instruction sequence is considered a feature.
4.3.1.6 Feature Reduction
After performing the feature selection and independence test, we applied two different feature
reduction techniques to create two datasets. These techniques include random forest and principal
component analysis. In addition to these two datasets we also kept the original dataset with all the
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Table 4.11: Reduced Feature Sets
Feature Size All Variables RF Variables PCA Variables
2 537 79 124
3 1334 124 148
4 1483 138 133
5 1466 138 120
Variable 492 89 164
6 906 148 164
7 363 99 200
8 71 35 68
9 27 15 27
10 15 10 15
20 0 0 0
features retained from the chi-square test output. In the results section 4.4, this dataset is referred
to as All variables.
4.3.1.7 Random Forest
We followed the same procedure for feature selection using random forest, that we developed for
the trojan dataset. The variables for which the mean decrease in accuracy was less than 10% were
rejected. In the results section 4.4, this dataset is referred to as RF variables
4.3.1.8 Principal Component Analysis
PCA was also employed under the similar conditions. We kept the variables that explained 95%
variance in the dataset and rejected others. In the results section 4.4, this dataset is referred to as
PCA variables
Table 4.11 displays the number of features in each dataset after applying the random forest and
principal component analysis, for each feature size.
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4.3.2 Experiments
Experiments were conducted on 30 different datasets. As explained in the previous section these
were generated by using a combination of feature size and selection mechanism. Each dataset was
partitioned into 70% training and 30% test data. Similar experiments showed best results with tree
based models for the count data [SWL08]. We built bagging and random forest models using R
[R].
4.3.2.1 Bagging
We used classification trees with 100 bootstrap replications in the Bagging model.
4.3.2.2 Random Forest
We grew 100 classification trees in the Random forest model. Each random forest model was first
tuned to obtain the optimal number of variables to be sampled at each node.
4.4 Results
As explained in the previous experiments, the 30% test data was used to test the efficiency of the
models. Table 4.12 displays the experimental results for each classifier, selection strategy and
n-gram size combination.
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Table 4.12: Experimental results for new and unknown
worms.






Random Forest All variable 94.3% 5.64% 94.24%
Random Forest RF variable 93.85% 7.6% 95.38%
Random Forest RF 5 93.04% 7.46% 93.56%
Random Forest RF 2 92.85% 5.74% 91.47%
Random Forest All 2 92.7% 6.85% 92.29%
Bagging RF 2 92.55% 6.65% 91.76%
Bagging All variable 92.5% 7.12% 92.12%
Bagging RF variable 92.35% 8.48% 93.23%
Random Forest RF 4 91.63% 7.45% 90.78%
Random Forest RF 8 91.63% 7.45% 90.78%
Random Forest RF 9 91.63% 7.45% 90.78%
Bagging RF 5 91.57% 8.28% 91.41%
Random Forest RF 3 91.51% 5.49% 88.63%
Random Forest PCA 4 91.38% 8.06% 90.8%
Random Forest PCA 5 91.38% 8.06% 90.8%
Continued on next page
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Table 4.12 – Experimental results for new and unknown worms.






Random Forest PCA 6 91.38% 8.06% 90.8%
Random Forest PCA 7 91.38% 8.06% 90.8%
Random Forest PCA 8 91.38% 8.06% 90.8%
Random Forest PCA 9 91.38% 8.06% 90.8%
Random Forest All 3 91.21% 7.01% 89.5%
Random Forest All 6 91.15% 7.42% 89.86%
Random Forest All 5 90.92% 8.96% 90.8%
Bagging All 3 90.76% 7.01% 88.63%
Bagging PCA 5 90.62% 10.75% 92.02%
Bagging RF 3 90.61% 7.32% 88.63%
Bagging PCA variable 90.55% 9.5% 90.61%
Random Forest PCA variable 90.4% 8.31% 89.09%
Bagging All 2 90.31% 6.85% 87.71%
Random Forest All 4 90.28% 8.39% 89.05%
Bagging All 5 90.17% 10.15% 90.49%
Random Forest PCA 2 90.01% 10.91% 90.96%
Random Forest PCA 3 89.57% 8.23% 87.46%
Continued on next page
76
Table 4.12 – Experimental results for new and unknown worms.






Random Forest RF 7 89.29% 11.21% 89.81%
Random Forest All 7 89.29% 10.91% 89.49%
Bagging PCA 3 89.27% 8.23% 86.88%
Random Forest RF 6 88.7% 10% 87.54%
Bagging RF 4 88.64% 8.7% 86.17%
Bagging RF 8 88.64% 8.7% 86.17%
Bagging RF 9 88.64% 8.7% 86.17%
Bagging RF 6 88.55% 7.42% 84.93%
Bagging PCA 2 88.23% 13.27% 89.76%
Bagging All 6 87.94% 9.03% 85.22%
Bagging PCA 4 87.29% 13.76% 88.3%
Bagging PCA 6 87.29% 13.76% 88.3%
Bagging PCA 7 87.29% 13.76% 88.3%
Bagging PCA 8 87.29% 13.76% 88.3%
Bagging PCA 9 87.29% 13.76% 88.3%
Bagging RF 7 87.27% 12.12% 86.62%
Bagging All 7 87.11% 13.03% 87.26%
Continued on next page
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Table 4.12 – Experimental results for new and unknown worms.






Random Forest All 8 81.13% 12.5% 75%
Bagging All 8 80.81% 11.84% 73.73%
Random Forest All 10 79.66% 12.35% 72.36%
Random Forest RF 10 79.66% 12.35% 72.36%
Bagging All 10 78.14% 15.14% 72%
Random Forest All 9 77.93% 22.64% 78.43%
Bagging RF 10 77.76% 15.94% 72%
Random Forest PCA 10 77.76% 14.34% 70.55%
Bagging PCA 10 77.57% 12.75% 68.73%
Bagging All 9 74.61% 27.92% 76.8%
Table 4.12 indicates that the variable length instruction sequences resulted in a higher detection
and a lower false positive rate than the fixed length instructions of various sizes. Combining the
statistics of table 4.10 with the results of table 4.12, it is also evident that variable length instruction
sequences resulted in a better overall accuracy with a dataset of lesser dimensions, than the fixed
length instruction sequences. Among the classifiers, random forest performed better than bagging































Figure 4.18: ROC curves comparing random forest results for each n-gram size using all variables.
Figures 4.18 - 4.25 display ROC curves comparing various combinations of classifiers, selec-
tion strategies and n-gram sizes. Figure 4.18 compares ROC curves for each n-gram size using ran-
dom forest classifier on all the variables. Figure 4.19, compares similar curves on the random forest
selection datasets, while figure 4.20, compares ROC curves on the PCA selection datasets. Figures
4.21, 4.22 and 4.23, compare similar ROC curves using bagging as the classification method. Fig-
ure 4.24 compares the results from each classifier on the random forest selected, variable length
instruction sequences dataset. Another area of interest is to compare the different feature selection
and reduction mechanisms used in these experiments. Figure 4.25 compares the ROC curves using
random forest classifier on the variable length instruction sequences dataset using all variables, RF












































































































































































































Figure 4.25: ROC curves comparing the variable selection methods (all variables, RF variables,
PCA variables)
Table 4.13: Area under the ROC curve for each classifier.
Classifier Variables Size AUC
Random Forest All var 0.9797275
Random Forest All 2 0.9769337
Random Forest RF 2 0.9765461
Bagging All var 0.974773
Random Forest RF var 0.9722357
Bagging RF 2 0.9708548
Random Forest RF 5 0.9691695
Continued on next page
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Table 4.13 – Area under the ROC curve for each classifier.
Classifier Variables Size AUC
Random Forest All 5 0.9689085
Random Forest RF 4 0.9677985
Random Forest RF 3 0.9668456
Random Forest RF 6 0.9656194
Random Forest All 6 0.9647966
Random Forest PCA 4 0.9640092
Bagging RF 5 0.9629567
Random Forest PCA 6 0.9628565
Bagging PCA var 0.9625978
Random Forest All 3 0.9624724
Random Forest PCA var 0.961695
Bagging RF var 0.9611786
Random Forest All 4 0.9611399
Bagging All 2 0.9604272
Random Forest PCA 5 0.9602692
Bagging All 3 0.9595703
Random Forest PCA 2 0.9570894
Bagging All 5 0.9569957
Continued on next page
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Table 4.13 – Area under the ROC curve for each classifier.
Classifier Variables Size AUC
Bagging RF 3 0.9562282
Bagging PCA 5 0.9562128
Bagging RF 4 0.9546736
Random Forest All 7 0.9543331
Random Forest RF 7 0.9534163
Bagging RF 6 0.9519028
Random Forest PCA 3 0.951264
Bagging All 6 0.9464049
Bagging PCA 2 0.9459697
Random Forest PCA 7 0.9448514
Bagging PCA 3 0.9435753
Bagging PCA 4 0.9434564
Bagging PCA 6 0.9399018
Bagging All 7 0.9380911
Bagging RF 7 0.93674
Bagging PCA 7 0.9280979
Random Forest RF 8 0.8872366
Random Forest All 8 0.8855346
Continued on next page
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Table 4.13 – Area under the ROC curve for each classifier.
Classifier Variables Size AUC
Random Forest PCA 8 0.8729024
Bagging RF 8 0.8710807
Bagging PCA 8 0.8692018
Bagging All 8 0.8684002
Random Forest RF 9 0.8493587
Random Forest PCA 10 0.8482651
Random Forest All 10 0.8458964
Random Forest RF 10 0.8458964
Bagging RF 10 0.8404781
Random Forest All 9 0.8399124
Bagging PCA 10 0.836762
Bagging All 10 0.8354075
Bagging PCA 9 0.8332223
Bagging RF 9 0.8211247
Random Forest PCA 9 0.8211




The unsupervised learning experiments involved using sequential association analysis on the mal-
ware collection. Association analysis is a form of descriptive data mining, where the focus is to
mine the data for patterns that describe association among data elements and are easily understand-
able by humans. It is the most common form of local pattern discovery in an unsupervised learning
environment. Association analysis discovers patterns in the form of association rules that describes
the elements that are frequently found together in the data and assign confidence scores to these
rules.
Association analysis can be best explained by Market Basket Analysis, which searches for
items that are frequently found together in a random market basket. In the malware detection
realm, association analysis can be used to discover features that are found together in each class of
programs, i.e. malware or clean, and use this information for the detection of new and unknown
malwares. Market basket analysis works at transaction level and finds items that are found together
in many transactions. An extension of association analysis is sequential association analysis, that
works at the user level, instead of transaction level. The user level analysis considers all the
transactions done by a specific user in a sequence.
As explained previously, the basic feature for our experiments is a variable length instruction
sequence. Intuitively, sequence mining was the method that we adopted for our experiments,
where each candidate item was an instruction sequence. We devised two types of experiments
using the association analysis for malware detection. One was to use association analysis for
feature extraction/selection and in the second class of experiments we used association analysis
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for automatic malware signature extraction.
5.1 Feature Extraction
Chapter 4 described the use of occurrence frequency as the main feature selection method. This
section explains the use of sequence mining as the primary feature extraction/selection mechanism.
We used the same collection of malware and clean programs that was used previously in 4.3.
The malware analysis, disassembly and feature extraction steps remained the same. The feature
extraction mechanism was different as we used sequential association mining as the primary feature
extraction/selection method, instead of unary variable removal. Features were originally extracted
from the parsed files. The sequential association mining extracted rules from these features that
can be used as features for a subsequent supervised learning process.
5.1.1 Data Processing
The vector representation of programs was no longer valid in sequence mining as the frequent
instruction sequences were searched globally in the entire data collection, instead of locally, within
a program.
5.1.1.1 Data Partitioning
Malware and clean sequences were separated prior to transforming the data into the form required
by the sequence node in the SAS/Enterprise Miner. This was done because sequence mining is an
unsupervised operation, so a target variable is not included during the process.
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5.1.1.2 Data Transformation
For each partition, the sequences from each program were stacked in a dataset and each sequence
was assigned an ID. For sequence mining, the sequence node in SAS/Enterprise Miner requires the
data to be in a N × 3 table, where N=∑ni li, n is the total number of sequences and l is the length of
each sequence. The first column holds the global ID for the sequence. Second column contains the
transposed sequence and the third column carries the within sequence ID, that displays the position
of each item in the sequence.
5.1.2 Sequence Mining
Sequential association mining was carried out with a 2% support on both the partitions separately,
resulting in a malware rules dataset and a clean rules dataset. These rules represent the instruction
sequences that were frequently found together in their respective partitions. The malware dataset
contained 758 rules while the clean dataset had 535 rules. The malware and clean rules datasets
were combined into one dataset with 831 rules.
5.1.2.1 Feature Extraction Process
We propose the idea of using these rules as potential features for a vector space model and build
a classifier that uses this data to classify between malware and clean programs. So, the next step
after combing the malware and clean rules into one dataset, was to choose the best rules among
them. We defined a signature rule to be a rule that is only found in one class. These signature
rules were removed, so were the rules that were too common in both the classes. The signature
rules were identified with a greater than 0% support in its signature class a 0% support in the other
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class. To identify the common rules the absolute difference in the support level in each class was
calculated and a 1% threshold was set, below which every rule was considered as too common,
and hence, rejected. After this step we were left with only 227 rules and that was considered the
final rule set. As explained previously, these rules represent the instruction sequences that were
frequently found together in the malware and clean data.
5.1.2.2 Dataset
We used the vector space model for final dataset representation. Each program was considered a
vector in a n dimensional space where n was the number of features selected using the sequential
association mining procedure described in the last section. A term document matrix was created
where each program represented a document, while rules representing instruction sequences were
considered as terms. A term frequency was computed for each rule within each program. A binary
target variable identified each program as malware or clean. We also added a heuristic flag variable
indicating if the malware or clean program was originally found in a packed or an unpacked state.
5.1.2.3 Independence Test
A Chi-Square test of independence was performed for each feature to determine if a relationship
exists between the feature and the target variable. The term document matrix was transformed
to a binary representation to get a 2-way contingency table. Using a p-value of 0.01 for the test
resulted in the removal of about half of the features that did not showed any statistically significant
relationship with the target.
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Table 5.1: Experimental results for new and unknown malwares using sequential association anal-
ysis as well as a combined selection method.
Classifier Selection Detection Rate False Alarm Rate Overall Accuracy
Random Forest Assoc 66.6% 21.4% 72.1%
Random Forest Merged 94.6% 10.2% 92.2%
5.1.3 Experiments
To perform the experiments, we constructed two datasets. The first contained the features selected
from the sequence mining process and another dataset that combined the features selected from the
sequence mining process and the occurrence frequency process. The datasets were partitioned into
70% training and 30% test data. Similar experiments showed best results with tree based models
for the count data [SWL08]. We built random forest models using R [R].
5.1.3.1 Random Forest
We grew 100 classification trees in the Random forest model. Each random forest model was first
tuned to obtain the optimal number of variables to be sampled at each node.
5.1.4 Results
We tested the model using the 30% test data from both the datasets. Table 5.1 displays the experi-
mental results.
Figure 5.1 compares the ROC curves for the results from the feature set, selected using se-
quence association mining only and the combined feature set with features from sequence associ-
ation mining and occurrence frequency.























Figure 5.1: ROC curves comparing the results for the features selected using sequence association
mining only and the combined feature set.
mining cannot be used towards a classification application, alone. The feature set can be merged
with another feature set to create a hybrid set of two distinct feature selection mechanism. The
94.6% detection rate on new and unknown malwares validates this point.
5.2 Automatic Malware Signature Extraction
Signature detection is the industry standard for fighting against malwares [ACK04a]. These sig-
natures are usually hand crafted by security experts. The first known data mining application for
malware detection was for automatic signature extraction by [KA94]. Results were not very im-
pressive but it opened the gate for data mining research in malware detection.
We propose a new idea of based upon association analysis to extract malware signatures. The
underlying idea is to extract instruction sequences that are found frequently in a collection of mali-
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cious programs and then filter the ones that have any occurrence in a collection of clean programs.
The result will be a generalized set of malware signatures that are not specific to any particular
malware. Such a general set of malware signatures can thwart zero day attacks and do not need
any human expertise.
5.2.1 Data Processing
We used the same collection of malware and clean programs that was used previously in 4.3. The
malware analysis and disassembly steps remained the same. Features were extracted using the
similar process but instead of saving the features from all the programs in one file, this time the
features from each program were saved individually in separate files. No feature selection mech-
anism was used as the vector representation of programs was not used in the signature extraction
scheme. Feature selection was implicit in the signature extraction algorithm. No partitioning is
required for these experiments as individual malware and clean data is used.
5.2.1.1 Data Transformation
Each program was converted from its instruction sequence representation to the conform the re-
quirements of the association node in SAS/Enterprise Miner. For sequence mining, the sequence
node in SAS/Enterprise Miner requires the data to be in a N × 3 table, where N=∑ni li, n is the total
number of sequences and l is the length of each sequence. The first column holds the global ID for
the sequence. Second column contains the transposed sequence and the third column carries the
within sequence ID, that displays the position of each item in the sequence.
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5.2.2 Signature Extraction
The signature extraction mechanism used an incremental process to create the signature database.
This databases was built by constantly adding new and unique class signatures from the program
collection and removing the ones that were found in both classes. We performed a series of exper-
iments by modifying the basic signature extraction algorithm for improved efficiency.
5.2.2.1 Basic Algorithm
The basic algorithm creates and updates a malware signature database. The database is updated
every time a new malware signature is found or an existing signature is found in a clean program.
The basic algorithm can be described as,
Input: A Collection of Files
Output: Malware Signature Database
Read a malware file;
Run assoc analysis on the file with 0% support;
Output the generated rules to create the signature database;
for each file do
Read the file;
Run assoc analysis on the file with 0% support;
Output the generated rules;
Search the signature database for the generated rules;
if True Positive or True Negative then
Goto next file;
end
else if False Positive then
Remove the signature from the signature database;
end
else if False Negative then
Add the signature to the signature database;
end
end
Algorithm 1: Basic algorithm for signature extraction
The main update is the step where the algorithm searches the signature database for the gen-
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erated rules. Four scenarios arise from this situation that are described as a truth table in table
5.2.
Scenario 1: The file being processed is a clean file and no match is found. A true negative (TN)
is generated in this case.
Scenario 2: The file being processed is a clean file and a match is found. A false positive (FP)
is generated in this case.
Scenario 3: The file being processed is a malware file and no match is found. A false negative
(FN) is generated in this case.
Scenario 4: The file being processed is a malware file and a match is found. A true positive
(TP) is generated in this case.
Scenarios 1 and 4 do not trigger any update to the malware database. The update is required
for scenarios 2 and 3. In the case of a false positive, the subject file is a clean file, therefore
the matching signature has to be removed from the malware signature database. Similarly in the
false negative case, the signature has to be added to the signature database, as the subject file is a
malware and the signature database do not carry a matching signature.
The algorithm is nothing more than an online version of the batch processing described in the
feature selection section of 5.1. The main difference is the nature and number of features that were
finally selected. In the feature selection scheme, signatures were removed and only the features
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that were common to both classes were kept. The signature extraction scheme kept the signatures
belonging to the malware class only. As the signatures are usually rare items, the signature ex-
traction ran the association analysis with 0% support while the feature selection mechanism was
interested in the most frequent features only, therefore the support level was 2%. The experiments
were carried out using SAS/Enterprise Miner on a Pentium 4, 3.0 GHz machine with 1 GB of mem-
ory. Initially the batch version was tried with 0% support but upon receiving memory problems,
the online version of the algorithm had to be developed.
The basic algorithm did not proved to be very efficient in terms of detection rate and false
positive rate. A very high false positive rate of 30% for the test dataset suggested that too many
signatures remained in the malware signature database that should have been filtered. Poor perfor-
mance of the basic algorithm led to the development of the modified algorithm.
5.2.2.2 Modified Algorithm
The basic algorithm was modified to include clean signatures also and a plurality vote on clean and
malware signatures decided if the subject file should be labeled as clean or malware. The modified
algorithm can be described as,
The modified algorithm treated clean programs also as target for clean signatures. This resulted
in two truth tables, one for each class. Table 5.3 gives the truth table for clean programs. In this
table a clean program whose signature is not found in the clean program is considered to be a false
negative. Similarly, table 5.4 gives the truth table for malwares.
These two truth tables can be combined to cover the eight possible scenarios at each iteration
of the algorithm.
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Input: A Collection of Files
Output: Malware and Clean Signature Databases
Read a malware file;
Run assoc analysis on the file with 0% support;
Output the generated rules to create the malware signature database;
Read a clean file;
Run assoc analysis on the file with 0% support;
Output the generated rules to create the clean signature database;
for each file do
Read the file;
Run assoc analysis on the file with 0% support;
Output the generated rules;
Search the malware signature database for the generated rules;
Search the clean signature database for the generated rules;
if True Positive or True Negative then
Goto next file;
end
else if False Positive then
if Subject File is a Malware then
Remove the matching signatures from the malware signature database;
end
else if Subject File is a Clean File then
Remove the matching signatures from the clean signature database;
end
end
else if False Negative then
if Subject File is a Malware then
Add the new signatures to the malware signature database;
end
else if Subject File is a Clean File then




Algorithm 2: Modified algorithm for signature extraction













Table 5.5: Truth table for the modified algorithm for malwares and clean programs
Malware Found in Clean Found in Malware Clean Malware
0 0 0 FNC TNM
0 0 1 FNC TNM
0 1 0 FNC TNM
0 1 1 FNC TNM
1 0 0 FNC TNM
1 0 1 FNC TNM
1 1 0 FNC TNM
1 1 1 FNC TNM
The scenarios described in the table 5.5, are explained below,
Scenario 1: The file being processed is a clean file and no matching signature is found in the
clean signature database and no matching signature is found in the malware signature database.
We defined this as a false negative clean (FNC) and a true negative malware (TNM) situation.
Scenario 2: The file being processed is a clean file and no matching signature is found in the
clean signature database and matching signatures are found in the malware signature database. We
defined this as a false negative clean (FNC) and a false positive malware (FPM) situation.
Scenario 3: The file being processed is a clean file and matching signatures are found in the
clean signature database and no matching signature is found in the malware signature database.
We defined this as a true positive clean (TPC) and a true negative malware (TNM) situation.
Scenario 4: The file being processed is a clean file and matching signatures are found in the
clean signature database and matching signatures are found in the malware signature database. We
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defined this as a true positive clean (TPC) and a false positive malware (FPM) situation.
Scenario 5: The file being processed is a malware file and no matching signature is found in
the clean signature database and no matching signature is found in the malware signature database.
We defined this as a true negative clean (TNC) and a false negative malware (FNM) situation.
Scenario 6: The file being processed is a malware file and no matching signature is found in
the clean signature database and matching signatures are found in the malware signature database.
We defined this as a true negative clean (TNC) and a true positive malware (TPM) situation.
Scenario 7: The file being processed is a malware file and matching signatures are found in
the clean signature database and no matching signature is found in the malware signature database.
We defined this as a false positive clean (FPC) and a false negative malware (FNM) situation.
Scenario 8: The file being processed is a malware file and matching signatures are found in the
clean signature database and matching signatures are found in the malware signature database. We
defined this as a false positive clean (FPC) and a true positive malware (TPM) situation.
5.2.3 Results
The basic algorithm was not able to stand the test for new and unknown malwares and gave a high
false positive rate of around 30%. This indicated the flaw in the filtering method as only those
signatures were filtered out that were found in the training data. A high number of signatures were
found in the clean programs in the test dataset. The modified algorithm remedied this problem.
Assigning the final class outcome based upon the majority vote for malware and clean signatures in
a file decreased the false positive rate significantly. Besides counts of the signatures, the signature
databases also carried the scores for each signature that described the probability of finding that
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Table 5.6: Experimental results for new and unknown malwares using automatically extracted
signatures by applying sequential association mining.
Method Detection Rate False Alarm Rate Overall Accuracy
Count 73.1% 2.2% 85.9%
Score 85.9% 7.0% 89.6%
Combined 86.5% 1.9% 92.5%
signature in the entire program collection. Besides count of the signatures, we used these scores





This dissertation provided an introduction to the malware research using data mining techniques.
We applied a four tier hierarchy to organize the research and included data mining in the top tier of
detection methods. Our work closely resembles information retrieval and classification techniques,
where we replaced text documents with computer programs and applied similar techniques. Un-
like previous attempts at applying data mining techniques at a syntactic level, using n-grams, we
introduced a variable length instruction sequence, that inherently captures program control flow in-
formation and hence provides a semantic level interpretation to the program analysis. In our quest
to choose the best classification model, we compared different feature selection methods and clas-
sifiers and provided empirical results. We proposed using association analysis for feature selection
and automatic signature extraction and were able to receive as low as 1.9% false positive rate and
as high as 93% overall accuracy on novel malwares with the algorithms that we devised. In the end
future work is proposed to extend the association analysis method for improved classification and




The malware detection using association analysis research is still in its initial stages. There are
many ideas and methods that are yet to be implemented. We present a number of ideas as future
research directions for using association analysis for malware detection.
7.1 Feature Extraction
Association analysis did not prove to be very effective for feature selection from malware and clean
files. The selected features performed poorly when used alone to classify between new unknown
malware and clean programs. Although we removed signature features and features that were too
common to both the classes, the performance was still poor.
For experimentation purposes, several other representations of the term document matrix that
resulted after the feature selection process, can be used. These include a normalized term count by
total number of terms or by the maximum number of terms. A log scale can also be used, but the
most notable representation is the TF-IDF representation. In the vector space model with a term
frequency or boolean representation, each coordinate of the document vector is computed locally,
taking into account only the particular term and document. This gives equal importance to all the
coordinates, that may not be the case. Some terms occur frequently in a number of documents,
but they may not be related to the defining contents of the document. On the other hand, there
may be terms that are not found in many documents, but may provide a better definition of the
document. This can be cured by the Inverse Document Frequency (IDF) method, that scales down
the contribution of frequent terms across the documents and scales up the rare terms. IDF is
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multiplied by TF, to get the feature representation. A series of experiments can be conducted for
these representation types.
7.2 Signature Extraction
The signature extraction method needs improvement on two grounds. First is to increase the de-
tection rate and second is to reduce the time and space complexity of the algorithm. The combined
measure of signature scores and count proved efficient with false positives but false negatives re-
mained high and that amounts for a bigger problem.
Signatures are essentially rare items and this should be the direction, the extraction mechanism
should proceed. Traditionally association analysis, gives the items that frequently occur together.
To extract the signatures as rare items, the negative border can be considered, where negative
border is the set of all infrequent items, that were rejected at each step. This would automatically
improve the space complexity.
We used SAS for the sequential association analysis that uses Apriori algorithm to perform the
task. It has been proven that the Apriori, is not the most efficient method for sequential pattern
analysis [Kan02]. For improved efficiency, Frequent Pattern-Growth (FP-Growth) method should
be used instead.
7.3 PE Header
Another area of experimentation is to use the information from the PE header. We initially de-
veloped a rule based system to detect malwares [SWL05]. Instead of using hand crafted heuristic
rules, association analysis can be employed to extract these rules from the malicious PE headers.
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7.4 Stratified Sampling
We did a random sampling to create training and test datasets with a holdout method with 70/30
split. For a better representation of the various malware families and variants a stratified sampling
approach can be applied. A temporal element can be added to the sampling procedure to reflect
the timeline of the appearance of different malwares. Malwares appearing later in a chronological
sequence of events should be part of test sample to represent newer malwares.
7.5 Real Time Implementation
This work was focused on academic research and the real time implementation of the proposed
data mining framework for malware detection was not discussed. The following issues needs to be
considered for a real time implementation of such a system.
7.5.1 Time and Space Complexity:
The major hindrance for such the real time implementation of such a data mining framework
is the time and space complexity of the machine learning and other algorithms involved. The
disassembly, parsing and feature extraction are time consuming processes and require a lot of space
also. In an automated framework these processes need to be streamlined for better efficiency.
7.5.2 Cost Sensitive Learning:
One thing that was not discussed in this work, is cost sensitiveness of the learning process. False
negatives carry a different cost than false positives. Leaving out a computer virus is not the same as
wrongly identifying a clean program as a virus. To address the issue, cost sensitive learning can be
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used, where a cost matrix can be defined carrying costs for different true and false identifications.
7.5.3 Class Distribution:
In the malware or fraud detection realm, the class distributions are highly skewed [PAL04], [BJL08].
Cost sensitive learning mentioned in the last paragraph, addresses this issue also. Other methods
include under sampling and over sampling. [MB02].
7.6 Combining Classifiers
In this work, we compared different classifiers and gave experimental results for the best one based
upon classification accuracy and ROC curves. [Web05] gave an excellent account of combin-
ing classifiers. Using this approach we can combine the output of different classifiers instead of
choosing the best one among them. The classifiers can be trained on the same dataset or different
datasets. For different datasets, one suggestion is, to combine the classifiers learned on PE header
information and instruction sequences to assign one final class to the output. For the same dataset,
several classifiers including random forest and neural networks, can be built and the final class
output can be assigned using a voting strategy.
7.7 More Classifiers
We covered an array of classifiers in out work. These include random forest, bagging, decision
tree, neural networks, support vector machines and logistic regression. Several other classifiers
can be added to this list including logic regression (using the Boolean representation of the term-
document matrix), Bayesian methods and nearest neighbor methods.
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